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Introduction
Over the past years, “real life” as well as academic macroeconomics has been under
the overwhelming influence of the world financial crisis. One only needs to recall
that it has been just ten years ago that Robert E. Lucas (in)famously declared the
“central problem of depression prevention” as “solved, for all practical purposes”
(Lucas, 2003) to get an impression of how profoundly the advent of the financial
crisis shocked the economics profession. However, as Socrates famously stated,
“wonder is the beginning of wisdom” (Plato, 1987), and if the crisis came as a
shock to economists, it certainly has been a healthy one, as it directed attention to
important research questions previously underappreciated.
The financial crisis also provides the background for the research questions treated
in this dissertation. While chapter one contributes to the literature on the origins
of the financial crisis, chapters two and three are motivated by one of its most sig-
nificant consequences, namely the dramatic rise in public debt. Over the course of
the last years, costly bank rescue packages and debt-financed stimulus programmes
boosted government debt levels, while the repercussions of the financial crisis on the
real economy depressed growth and led to declining tax revenues. At now 108%,
the debt to GDP ratio of advanced economies increased by almost 50% compared
to 2007 (International Monetary Fund, 2013). While, back then, sovereign debt of
advanced economies was perceived as basically risk-free, the increase in public debt
led to a re-evaluation of risks which prompted rating agencies to massively down-
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grade the sovereign debt of some countries, especially in the Eurozone. Against
this background, chapter two analyses whether and under which conditions a rating
agency’s announcement on one country leads to spillover effects on the refinancing
costs of other countries. As the Greek debt restructuring in 2012 exemplified, even
sovereign defaults — unimaginable for advanced economies before the start of the
crisis — can no longer be excluded as an option. As even conservative macroe-
conomists like Kenneth Rogoff state that “any realistic strategy for dealing with the
eurozone crisis must involve massive write-downs (forgiveness) of peripheral coun-
tries’ debt” (Rogoff, 2013), this may not have been the last incidence of a default.
Chapter three therefore studies the costs that a sovereign default entails for a coun-
try’s GDP growth. The chapters are arranged chronologically in the order of their
inception and can be read independently. In the following, I will give a brief outline
of each chapter of this dissertation.
The first chapter sheds new light on the origins of the financial crisis, which em-
anated from the investment behaviour of financial institutions. Even today, many
people shake their head in disbelief when they reflect on how it could come about
that those big banks with their huge and sophisticated risk management depart-
ments ended up investing so much money in assets that turned out to be basically
worthless. To account for this investment behaviour, great importance is attached
to the so-called risk-taking channel of monetary policy, which states that low central
bank policy rates increase the risk-hunger of financial institutions.
This chapter contributes to the literature by proposing a new transmission mecha-
nism for the risk-taking channel that highlights the role of the central bank’s interest
rate as a signal for its preferences. In the model, the central bank cares both about
macroeconomic and financial stability but possesses only one instrument, its inter-
est rate, to pursue its policy objectives. While the (private) banks are generally
aware of the central bank’s policy goals, they are only imperfectly informed about
2
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(i) the central bank’s preference for financial stability and about (ii) its assessment
of the macroeconomic situation. Since the importance the central bank attaches to
financial stability can be interpreted as the degree to which the banks are insured
against the risk of a financial crisis, banks try to infer the degree of insurance by
assessing the economic situation themselves and by coming up with a “counterfac-
tual” interest rate. The problem, however, is that should the banks’ assessment of
the economic situation differ from the one of the central bank, banks misinterpret
the policy preferences of the central bank and can erroneously overinvest in risky
assets.
As I illustrate, this concept of “monetary policy misperception” can provide new
insights into the build-up of financial sector risk during the years preceding the
crisis. Thus, a striking particularity of the pre-crisis years consists in the dramatic
divergence of inflation expectations by the Fed and the private sector. Over the
period from 2002 to 2006, the inflation expectations of the private sector persistently
turned out much higher than the inflation forecasts by the central bank. Based on
the theoretical model, I argue that this divergence in economic outlooks may have
given rise to a dangerous misinterpretation of monetary policy that might have
played a significant role for the build-up of financial risk during the pre-crisis period.
Hence, I contribute to the literature on the risk-taking channel by stressing that it
is not only the interest rate of the central bank per se, but also the interpretation
of that interest rate that matters for the banks’ attitude towards risk. Thus, my
study lends further support to the notion that a clear and transparent central bank
communication policy has to be a central element of any successful monetary policy.
The second chapter analyses spillover effects across sovereign debt markets in the
wake of sovereign rating changes.1 Ever since the start of the Eurozone debt crisis,
1This chapter is based on the article “Credit Ratings and Cross-Border Bond Market
Spillovers”, which is joint work with Benjamin Böninghausen from the University of Munich (see
Böninghausen and Zabel, 2013).
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announcements of credit rating agencies on the creditworthiness of Eurozone mem-
ber states have been one of the main driving forces for developments in the sovereign
bond market. This has drawn considerable attention to the impact and potential
side effects of the rating agencies’ actions. In particular, the idea that an agency’s
rating action on one country might affect the refinancing costs of other countries
alarmed policymakers and provided one of the main rationales for the European
Commission to just recently set up stricter rules for credit rating agencies.
While spillovers are thus highly relevant from a policy perspective, their presumed
existence is not straightforward to identify in financial markets where confounding
events are ubiquitous and hamper the establishment of clear counterfactuals. We
therefore make a methodological contribution to the literature in proposing a novel
empirical strategy to cleanly identify the existence of cross-border spillover effects
of sovereign rating announcements. This is made possible by collecting an extensive
dataset of the complete history of rating actions by the “Big Three” (Standard &
Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch) and daily sovereign bond market movements for up to
73 countries between 1994 and 2011. Exploiting substantial variation across crisis
and non-crisis periods as well as developed and emerging economies, we perform an
explicit counterfactual analysis. This pits bond market reactions to small revisions
in an agency’s assessment of a country’s creditworthiness against reactions to all
other, more major changes. Importantly, we demonstrate that this helps to avoid
the problems associated with a classic event-study approach in a spillover context,
and that it relieves us of having to make additional assumptions as a number of
other papers.
Our findings suggest that rating downgrades indeed trigger significant negative
spillovers which turn out to be highly robust to a number of tests. On the other
hand, evidence for positive spillovers emanating from upgrades is much more lim-
ited at best. This points to an important asymmetry in the processing of positive
4
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and negative information by the sovereign debt market. Regarding potential chan-
nels of spillovers, we find that spillovers from downgrades tend to be significantly
more pronounced for countries within the same region. Strikingly, however, we
find that bilateral trade linkages, financial integration, or fundamental similarities
between countries cannot explain why belonging to a common region amplifies neg-
ative spillover effects. This is particularly interesting in view of the notion inherent
in many policy discussions and proposals that spillovers are in some sense unwar-
ranted, so as to merit an intervention by the state to constrain the agencies’ scope of
action. While the amount of measurable fundamentals is naturally limited, our find-
ings do not suggest that concerns over countries being found “guilty by association”
in financial markets can be easily dismissed.
Chapter three finally studies the impact of sovereign default and debt renegotiation
on a country’s GDP growth. Given the dramatic increase in public debt levels,
recent years have seen interest in the topic of sovereign debt and default resurface.
A particularly relevant question in this context is, to what extent a sovereign de-
fault depresses economic activity in the defaulting country. Many empirical studies
have shown that sovereign defaults tend to go along with substantial contractions
in output. Yet, a central shortcoming of the existing empirical literature is that
it typically categorises debt crises as dichotomous events, which hides enormous
variation in crisis characteristics.
Therefore, the main contribution of chapter three is to take the diversity in sovereign
debt crises seriously and to empirically assess whether and to what extent the output
costs of sovereign defaults differ depending on the severity of a default. Specifically,
we distinguish between “hard” and “soft” defaults by building on two distinct em-
pirical measures on the heterogeneity of debt crisis events. The first measure is
the index of debtor coerciveness, which is procedural and captures a government’s
payment and negotiation behaviour vis-à-vis foreign creditors during defaults. The
5
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second measure is the main outcome of debt renegotiations, namely the size of cred-
itor losses or “haircuts” implied in the debt restructuring agreement at the end of
a debt crisis.
We find that confrontational government behaviour during default is associated
with a much steeper drop in output. On average, coercive or “hard” defaults see a
significantly lower GDP growth of up to six percentage points annually compared to
“soft” defaults in which the government opted for a consensual stance. This result is
highly robust to a number of tests. Moreover, we find little evidence that it is driven
by reverse causality. This suggests that not only the incidence of default matters,
as implied by much of the previous literature, but also its severity. Surprisingly
however, we do not find that the “type” of default also influences a country’s post-
default growth prospects, which appears to be remarkably independent from crisis
characteristics.
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Monetary Policy Misperception
and the Risk-Taking Channel
1.1 Introduction
As a result of the recent financial crisis, the relationship between monetary policy
and financial sector risk-taking, which has long been ignored by economists and
policy-makers alike, is now in the middle of an intense discussion. In search for
the causes of the crisis, many economists today point at the monetary policy of
the Federal Reserve as the main culprit. Its loose monetary policy stance, they say,
has fuelled financial sector risk-taking and therefore substantially contributed to the
dramatic build-up of financial imbalances over the pre-crisis years.
Following the terminology of Borio and Zhu (2012), the relationship between mon-
etary policy and financial sector risk-taking is today known as the “risk-taking
channel” of monetary policy. Simply put, the risk-taking channel posits that the in-
terest rate set by the central banks and the risk appetite of financial institutions are
inversely related, such that a drop in the central bank’s policy rate induces financial
institutions to increase their risk-taking while a rise in the policy rate causes them to
7
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downscale their risk exposure. Several empirical studies have verified the existence
of such a structural relationship along multiple dimensions of financial sector risk-
taking (credit risk, leverage risk, maturity transformation risk)1. While economists
have identified several mechanisms through which the central bank’s policy rate can
affect the financial sector’s risk aversion (see section 1.2 for a detailed discussion),
monetary policy misperception has not been addressed by the literature so far.
The argumentation I am going to develop can be roughly summarised as follows:
While it is commonly assumed that central banks set their policy rates taking into
account the classic “Taylor rule” ingredients (inflation and the output gap), I pre-
sume that the central bank further includes financial stability concerns in its con-
siderations when setting interest rates. Financial institutions are aware of this fact,
but unsure how much importance the central bank places on financial stability.
Since the extent of central bank remedy in case of a crisis crucially affects the fi-
nancial sector’s optimal loan allocation, the financial sector tries to infer the weight
of financial stability concerns in the central bank’s policy function from observing
the central bank’s policy rate setting over time. However, given that the central
bank does not publish the economic forecasts on which its policy rate setting relies,
diverging opinions on the future outlook of the economy can lead to a misinterpre-
tation of monetary policy by the banking sector, which results in inefficiently high
bank risk-taking.
As I am going to illustrate, the concept of monetary policy misperception can shed
new light on the build-up of financial sector imbalances in the US over the pre-
crisis years. Thus, a striking particularity of this period consists in the dramatic
divergence of inflation expectations by the Fed and the private sector. From 2002
onward, the inflation forecasts of the private sector persistently turned out much
1See e.g. Altunbas et al. (2010); Jiménez et al. (2008); Ioannidou et al. (2009); López et al.
(2010); Gambacorta (2009); Delis and Kouretas (2011).
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higher than the inflation forecasts of the central bank. Based on the insights of the
theoretical model, I argue that this divergence in economic outlooks can have led
to a dangerous misinterpretation of monetary policy by the financial institutions
which might have played an important role in the build-up of financial risk during
the pre-crisis period.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows: In section 1.2, I will review the
existing theoretical literature on the risk-taking channel. In section 1.3, I develop
the theoretical model and show how the concept of monetary policy misperception
can increase banks’ risk-taking. Section 1.4 analyses the pre-crisis years in the US
in the light of the theoretical model and shows that monetary policy misperception
might have been a crucial factor for the build-up of financial risk over the pre-crisis
period. Section 1.5 concludes.
1.2 Related literature
It has been only recently that economists became interested in the question how the
central bank’s interest rate setting affects the risk allocation of financial institutions.
Until the middle of last decade, there has virtually been no research that explicitly
studied the effects of monetary policy on risk-taking. On the one hand, the macroe-
conomic literature by and large abstracted from risk-taking choices and was much
more concerned about the effects of monetary policy on the quantity rather than on
the quality of loans. To the extent that “risk” was considered at all, it was rather the
riskiness of borrowers than the risk attitude of lenders that constituted the focus of
attention. On the other hand, the banking and finance literature has been studying
financial sector risk-taking for a long time. However, this research typically focused
on how to correct market failures stemming from limited liability and asymmetric
9
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information while basically ignoring the potential impact of monetary policy on a
bank’s risk choices.
Thus, it was only in the middle of the 2000s that economists started to become aware
of the risk-taking side-effects of monetary policy. With the advent of the financial
crisis, which revealed the extent of risk in the financial sector, this field of research
quickly developed into one of the most vivid research branches of monetary policy.
Since then, many papers have empirically verified that the stance of monetary policy
indeed influences the banks’ appetite for risk. This has been shown both at the
international level (through cross-country analysis) and for single countries, for wide
ranges of risk measures, and based on a variety of identification strategies (see e.g.
Altunbas et al., 2010; Jiménez et al., 2008; Ioannidou et al., 2009; López et al.,
2010; Gambacorta, 2009; Delis and Kouretas, 2011). But how does it come that
loose monetary policy incentivises the financial sector to take on more risk?
The “search for yield” channel, described by Rajan (2005), is probably the most
prominent explanation. Rajan derives the risk-taking channel from the fact that
important financial institutions (such as pension funds or insurance companies)
need to match the yield promised on their (long-term) liabilities with the return
they obtain from their assets. While in “normal times” a conservative investment
strategy is sufficient to generate the required returns, the low yields on save assets
prevailing in low interest rate periods may compel these institutions to “search for
yield” and to switch to riskier investments. Consequently, an environment of low
policy rates exerts pressure on financial institutions to increase their risk exposure.
A second line of reasoning stresses the importance of the central bank’s policy rate
for valuations, incomes and cash flows in the economy (Borio and Zhu, 2012). In line
with the “financial accelerator” of Bernanke et al. (1996), a monetary easing leads
to revaluation effects on future incomes and cash flows that boost firms’ collateral
values. Given the risk management models employed by the financial sector, those
10
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revaluations ceteris paribus give rise to more benign assessments on the riskiness
of borrowers. This decreased risk perception in turn induces the financial sector to
increase its investment in ex-ante risky assets.
Another propagation mechanism for the risk-taking channel is the so-called “as-
set substitution channel” (see e.g. De Nicolò et al., 2010). Here, the risk-taking
incentives emanating from monetary policy are attributed to technical portfolio ad-
justments following changes in the policy rate. Since a drop in the central bank’s
policy rate is equivalent to a drop in the interest rate on very safe, short-term assets
or loans, it leads to an increase in the relative price of those assets. This price
increase triggers substitution effects in the portfolio of financial institutions, which
now increase their demand for risky assets. Under fairly general specifications of the
financial sector’s preferences (most importantly, under the standard assumption of a
risk-neutral financial sector), it can be shown that the substitution effect dominates
the opposing income effect and that therefore an interest rate drop should induce
the financial sector to increase its investment in more risky and more long-term
assets (Fishburn and Porter, 1976).
By focusing on the monetary policy regime rather than on the monetary policy
rate, other authors tackle the monetary policy—risk-taking relationship from a com-
pletely different perspective. While the previous explanations described the risk-
taking channel as a somewhat technical reaction of financial institutions to changes
in policy rates, it is now assumed that the risk-taking incentives result from the
financial sector’s active attempt to exploit moral hazard effects that emanate from
the central bank’s anticipated reaction function. Focusing on the central bank’s role
as a lender of last resort, it is shown that if the central bank commits to provide
unlimited liquidity support in crisis times, this gives rise to an “insurance effect”
11
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that boosts banks’ investments in illiquid assets (Diamond and Rajan, 2012; Cao
and Illing, 2012; Farhi and Tirole, 2012; Giavazzi and Giovannini, 2010).2
1.3 The model
This chapter proposes a new propagation mechanism for the risk-taking channel
that combines the reasoning of both strands of the theoretical literature. In my
model the monetary policy rate affects the banks’ risk-taking choices by working
as a signal for the monetary policy regime. In contrast to the existing literature
on the monetary policy regime, I assume that banks are only imperfectly informed
about the central bank’s reaction function, which gives the monetary policy rate
an important signalling function. Since the central bank’s policy regime is highly
relevant for the investment decision of banks, they try to infer the central bank’s
reaction function from its policy rate setting behaviour. Hence, by its interest rate
decision the central bank not only affects the economy via the classical interest rate
channel, but also affects the banks’ expectations about its future policy.
If in times of financial distress the central bank reduces its interest rate below a
level previously expected by banks, they will update their expectations and assume
a similar central bank reaction pattern for comparable situations in the future. Since
expectations about the monetary policy regime directly affect the banks’ investment
strategy, changes in expectations will automatically feed back on their investment
behaviour. To the extent that a policy rate drop induces banks to expect a more
accommodating monetary policy in the future, this gives the banks incentives to
follow a more risky investment strategy — the risk-taking channel. Thus, I con-
2This strand of literature is, if anything, only very loosely related to the risk-taking channel.
Even though the focus on bank’s risk choices places this approach in close proximity to the risk-
taking channel literature, Diamond and Rajan (2012), Farhi and Tirole (2012), as well as Giavazzi
and Giovannini (2010) do not make explicit reference to the risk-taking channel with in their
papers.
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tribute to the literature on the risk-taking channel by stressing that it is not only
the policy rate per se but also the interpretation of that policy rate which matters
for the banks’ attitude towards risk.
1.3.1 Basic model setup
The model builds on the basic framework of Cao and Illing (2010, 2011, 2012). The
economy extends over an infinite time horizon, T={0,1,...,t,...}, and consists of four
types of agents, (1) depositors, (2) entrepreneurs, (3) banks and (4) the central
bank.
1. Depositors live for two periods in overlapping generations. In each period
t ∈ T , a new generation of depositors, call them “young” depositors, is born
with an endowment Dt. It is assumed that the endowment of young deposi-
tors depends negatively on the change in the current policy rate of the central
bank, Dt = Dt(4rCBt ), which will be explained in more detail later on. To keep
things simple, the number of “young” depositors is kept constant over time, so
there is no change in population. Depositors do not care about consumption
when they are young but derive their whole utility from consumption in period
t+1 when they are old. In period t, they can either store their endowment for
a nominal return of d = 1, or deposit their funds in a bank at the deposit rate
dt≥1. Depositors are risk averse in the sense that their marginal utility of con-
sumption is strictly decreasing in the amount of consumption. For simplicity,
I assume a square root utility function for depositors: U(Ct) =
√
Ct.
2. Entrepreneurs live for three periods. In each period t ∈ T , a generation of
“young” entrepreneurs is born. Entrepreneurs are born without any endow-
ment but have the ability to run a business. However, before they can start a
business they have to receive seed funding and therefore ask for a loan. There
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are two different types of entrepreneurs, safe and risky ones, contingent on
the type of business project that they want to start.3 Safe projects yield a
riskless return of R1 > 1 in the following period. Risky projects generate a
higher return R2 > R1, but finish only with probability pt (which stochasti-
cally varies over time) in the next period. This means that with probability
(1− pt) ≥ 0 the project is delayed and does not yield returns in t+ 1 but only
in t+2. Thus, the type of risk that risky projects exhibit is pure liquidity risk.
Entrepreneurs always retain a share (1 − γ) < 1 of their projects’ proceeds,
which means that they can only commit to pay out a fraction γ < 1 of the
project’s return to their investor. In contrast to depositors, entrepreneurs are
risk-neutral and indifferent about the timing of consumption, so consumption
in t+ 1 and t+ 2 both provides them with the same level of utility.
3. Banks are infinitely lived and compete in each period for the funds of “young”
depositors by setting their deposit rate dt in a perfectly competitive market.
Hence, in equilibrium banks make zero profit and all surplus is transferred to
depositors in the form of deposit payments dt. As experts in credit markets,
banks possess superior monitoring skills compared to depositors, which means
that the hold-up problem stemming from the retention of parts of the project’s
proceeds by the entrepreneurs is less severe for banks (higher γ for banks
compared to depositors).4 As financial intermediaries, banks maximise their
depositors’ expected return by investing their depositors’ endowment Dt in
the projects run by the entrepreneurs. A share 0 ≤ αt ≤ 1 of the funds is
3It is assumed that the number of projects of each type always exceeds the endowment of
depositors such that funding is scarce and not all projects are financed.
4The fact that the hold-up problem is more severe for depositors justifies the presence of banks
as financial intermediaries. Assume that the depositors’ monitoring skills are insufficient to make
direct investments in entrepreneurs profitable, while the banks’ γ is high enough for projects to
be financed (γR1 > 1). This prevents the realisation of the frictionless market outcome in which
each generation of depositors simply invests in the riskless project and consumes its proceeds in
the subsequent period. Hence, from now on γ always denotes the γ of banks.
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invested in safe and the remainder (1−αt) in risky projects. It is assumed that
the type of project (safe or risky) an entrepreneur intends to start is common
information such that adverse selection effects are absent.
The three sectors interact in the model as following: In period t, a generation
of young depositors is born with an endowment of Dt. Banks compete for the
depositors’ funds by promising a deposit rate dt on endowment stored at their bank.
The maximum deposit rate banks are willing to offer depends on their investment
behaviour, i.e. the allocation of funds to safe and risky projects, which in turn
depends on the banks’ expectations on the share of risky projects that finishes
early or gets delayed next period (i.e. the realisation of pt+1). Consequently, banks
conduct forecasts on pt+1 and condition their investment behaviour as well as their
deposit rate offer on that forecast. Due to the assumption of perfect (Bertrand)
competition among banks, in equilibrium all banks will offer an identical deposit
rate dt and exhibit an identical risk profile in their investments.
At the beginning of period t+1, the share of risky projects that finishes early (pt+1)
and the share that gets delayed (1− pt+1) is revealed, i.e. pt+1 realises. The banks
now have to make the promised payment of dt−1Dt−1 to their “old” depositors, which
now want to consume.5 However, in period t + 1 banks will only generate returns
from their investments in safe projects and from the share pt+1 of risky projects
that turns out early (i.e. is not delayed). In addition, entrepreneurs retain a share
(1−γ) of the projects’ proceeds for themselves, such that banks receive the following
payment stream on their period t investments: γ {αtR1 + (1− αt)pt+1R2}.
In case that γ {αtR1 + (1− αt)pt+1R2} < dt, i.e. the return on “early” projects
does not suffice to pay out “old” depositors, banks can turn to early entrepreneurs
to bridge-finance the difference. Those retain (1 − γ) {αtR1 + (1− αt)pt+1R2} and
5While the model is set in an overlapping generations framework, by the timing of a period I
exclude the possibility that banks use the funds of “young” depositors to pay out “old” depositors.
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Figure 1.1: Basic structure and timing of the model
Notes — The figure illustrates the basic structure and the timing of the model, as outlined in subsection
1.3.1, in the absence of a bank run.
— since they are indifferent between consuming in t + 1 or t + 2 — are willing
to lend to banks at the market rate rt ≥ 1. The borrowing rate in t + 1, rt+1, is
determined by the interaction of liquidity demand by banks and liquidity supply of
early entrepreneurs: rt+1 =
γ{αtR1+(1−αt)pt+1R2}−dt
(1−γ){αtR1+(1−αt)pt+1R2} . The numerator of the equation
signifies liquidity demand and the denominator liquidity supply. The bigger the
ratio of liquidity demand to liquidity supply, the higher will equilibrium borrowing
rate. Figure 1.1 summarises the structure of the model as outlined so far.
Early entrepreneurs know that late projects will yield a return of R2 in the next
period (no credit risk). However, they will only lend to those banks that will be
able to repay the bridge-loan (plus interest) in the next period t + 2. But if the
equilibrium borrowing rate rt rises above a certain threshold level r̄, the future
income of the bank will not be enough to repay the entrepreneurs. The bank then
becomes insolvent. Anticipating imminent insolvencies, depositors will run those
16
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banks with looming payment problems and force them to liquidate all their current
investments (including safe projects) at an inferior return R3 < 1.
6
1.3.2 The market equilibrium
In equilibrium, a representative bank i allocates its investments to safe and risky
projects in such a way that it maximises its expected returns. The optimal invest-
ment scheme crucially depends on the bank’s belief about the share of risky projects
that turns out early and late, i.e. on the realisation of pt+1. As stated before, banks
hence conduct forecasts on that parameter, pet+1. With probability π, this forecast
proves to be correct (i.e. pet+1 = pt+1). But with probability (1 − π), pt+1 will
deviate from the banks’ forecasts by ξt+1, which is assumed to be about normally
distributed in the range [-a, 0].7 In the following I assume that the probability π
for the banks’ forecasts to be correct is sufficiently large to make it optimal for all
banks to base their investment choice on that scenario.
Therefore, in each period t ∈ T the market equilibrium results from each bank i
choosing its share of safe investments αi such as to maximise its expected profit for
pt+1 = p
e
t+1:
αi,t = arg max
αi,t∈[0;1]
γ
{
αi,tR1 + (1− αi,t)
[
(pet+1R2 +
(1− pet+1)R2
ret+1
)
]}
Due to perfect (Bertrand) competition in the banking sector, bank i makes an
expected profit of zero and has to pass its entire expected profit on to its depositors:
di,t = max
αi,t∈[0;1]
γ
{
αi,tR1 + (1− αi,t)
[
(pet+1R2 +
(1− pet+1)R2
ret+1
)
]}
6It is assumed that a bank that gets run will be restructured and can restart its business in
the same period such that, independent of the occurrence of bank runs, the number of banks stays
constant over time.
7More precisely, I assume ξt+1 to be equal to the sum of two iid parameters τ and υ, which
are both uniformly distributed in the space [−a2 ; 0]. According to the central limit theorem, the
sum of two identically distributed iid variables is about normally distributed. Therefore ξ is about
normally distributed in [-a; 0] with a mean of a2 . As pt is a probability, I further assume that a ≤ 1
and that (pt + ξt) ⊆ [0, 1].
17
1. Monetary Policy Misperception and the Risk-Taking Channel
The market equilibrium thus features a unique optimal symmetric equilibrium of
pure strategy with the following characteristics8:
1. All banks invest the share α∗t =
γ−pet+1
γ−pet+1+(1−γ)
R1
R2
of their funds in the safe asset
and offer a deposit rate of d∗t = γ[α
∗
tR1 + (1− α∗t )R2] to their depositors.
2. If in period t + 1 the share of delayed projects turns out as expected by the
banks, i.e. pt+1 = p
e
t+1, then the borrowing rate rt+1 = 1 and all banks remain
solvent.
3. If, however, the share of delayed projects exceeds the banks’ expectations, i.e.
pt+1 < p
e
t+1, liquidity demand increases and the borrowing rate rt+1 will rise
above the threshold level r̄ = 1. There will be a bank run and those banks
that are run have to liquidate all their assets at R3 < 1.
1.3.3 The role of the central bank
In this model setup, the introduction of a central bank can help to increase the
economy’s general welfare in two ways:
(1) First, given risk averse depositors, the stochastic variation in the share of “early”
risky projects pt decreases the intertemporal welfare of depositor. Assume that pt
follows iid and is about normally distributed in Ω ⊆ [0, 1]. If pt+1 is correctly
expected to turn out relatively high, banks will maximize profits by increasing their
scale of risky investments in period t. This leads to an increase in “output” (the
return generated by period t investments) in t+1, Yt+1.
9 Due to perfect competition,
banks pass this (anticipated) increase in returns to their depositors and promise
them a relatively high deposit rate dt in period t. In the absence of bank runs,
8The proof of these results is analogous to Cao (2010).
9It holds that production Yt+1 = [α
∗
tR1 + (1 − α∗t )pt+1R2]Dt is increasing in pt+1, as long as
pet+1 = pt+1.
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this increases the consumption possibilities of depositors born in period t, which is
equal to the endowment with which depositors have been born times the rate of
return they receive on their deposits, Ct+1 = dtDt. If, on the other hand, only a
small share of the risky projects is (correctly) anticipated to finish early, then —
in the same vein — banks have to downscale their high yield investments in period
t, which results in a lower output Yt+1 and decreased consumption possibilities for
period t depositors.
Hence, the parameter pt can be interpreted as a (temporary) stochastic production
shock that affects the depositors’ consumption possibilities. Since depositors are
risk averse, positive production shocks increase the depositors’ utility to a lesser
extent than negative shocks decrease it. By stabilising shocks to production, the
central bank can thus increase the intergenerational welfare in the model economy.
Since the level of endowment with which “young” depositors are born depends neg-
atively on the change in the central bank’s policy rate, Dt = Dt(4rCBt ), the central
bank can influence future output and the depositors’ consumption by adjusting its
current policy rate rCBt . To make sure that its interest rate policy indeed stabilises
and not amplifies production swings, the central bank conducts forecasts on the
future production shock pt+1. It is public information that ∀t ∈ T , pt is about nor-
mally distributed in Ω ⊆ [0, 1] around a mean of µ = 0.5.10 Therefore, the economy
attains its “natural” level of output at Yn = [α
∗
nR1 + (1 − α∗n)µR2]D|∆rCB=0 for
pt = p
e
t = µ.
11
To stabilise production (and thus depositors’ consumption), the central bank reduces
its policy rate (4rCBt < 0) if its forecast signals a shock to future production that
would decrease Yt+1 below Yn, hence if its forecast signals a looming “output gap”
10More technically, assume that pt = 0.5 + ηt + κt, where both γt and δt are iid and uniformly
distributed in the interval [-0.25;0.25]. Since the sum of two iid and uniformly distributed random
variables converges to a normal distribution for t → ∞, pt is about normally distributed in Ω ⊆
[0, 1] with a mean of µ = 0.5.
11α∗n signifies the optimal investment allocation of banks if pt = p
e
t = µ.
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Figure 1.2: Central bank production stabilisation
Notes — The figure illustrates the role of the central bank as a stabiliser of output volatility. If the
central bank forecasts a production shock pt+1 that would increase production above its natural level
next period, it increases its policy rate, thus lowering the endowment of “young” depositors and, hence,
future production Yt+1. If, however, it forecasts a pt+1 that would result in future production below
potential, it decreases its policy rate, such that future production is stabilized by the resulting increase in
the endowment of “young” depositors.
Xt+1 < 0 (which is the case for any pt+1 < µ). In turn it increases its policy
rate (4rCBt > 0) if it forecasts an output larger than potential in t + 1 (which
is the case for any pt+1 > µ). Assume that, in contrast to private banks, the
central bank receives a signal without any noise, such that pet+1(CB) = pt+1, ∀t ∈ T .
In the absence of bank-runs the central bank can in this way completely stabilise
production and depositors’ consumption at its natural level. Figure 1.2 illustrates
the central bank’s stabilisation behaviour.
(2) Second, bank runs decrease the economy’s overall welfare since the liquidation of
projects at an inferior return of R3 < 1 leads to a waste of resources. In the absence
of a bank run, period t investments will yield a return of (αtR1 + (1− αt)R2) over
the next two periods (no credit risk). However, in case of a bank run, troubled
banks have to liquidate all their investment projects and the return reduces to R3.
Hence, banks run induce a welfare loss of L = [αtR1 + (1−αt)R2−R3]Drunt , where
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Drunt denotes the amount of deposits at troubled banks. Therefore, the central bank
possesses an incentive to avoid those costly bank runs.
In the model, a bank run happens only if the equilibrium borrowing rate rt, deter-
mined by market forces (liquidity demand and supply), rises above the threshold
level r̄. At this threshold level, the borrowing rate depresses the collateral value of
“late” projects so much, that a bank with payment problems is not able to raise suf-
ficient funds to pay out all its current depositors. This occurs whenever the banks’
forecast on the production shock pt+ turns out as too optimistic (i.e. pt+1 < p
e
t+1),
which is the case with probability (1− π).12 What can the central bank do?
It is assumed that instead of borrowing from “early” entrepreneurs, banks can also
turn to the central bank for a bridge-loan at the policy rate rCBt ≥1. Since banks
are going to borrow from the source that offers the more attractive conditions, the
effective borrowing rate that banks face in each period t will therefore be equal
to rt = min
{
γ{αt−1R1+(1−αt−1)ptR2}−dt−1
(1−γ){αt−1R1+(1−αt−1)ptR2} ; r
CB
t
}
. By lowering its policy rate in crisis
times to r̄, the central bank can thus always prevent costly bank runs.
Hence, the central bank’s policy rate plays a dual role. On the one hand, it is the
central bank’s instrument for stabilising future expected output fluctuations. On
the other hand, it can also be used to avert financial turmoil in the current period.
This dual role of the policy rate constitutes the core of the model.
Given these motives, the central bank behaves as follows: At the beginning of each
period t ∈ T , it forecasts the future production shock pCBt+1. Based on that forecast,
the central bank stabilises future production by following a Taylor-like interest rate
rule that includes the (expected) future “output gap” ECBt (Xt+1) as an argument.
At the same time, it observes the current conditions on the liquidity market and
evaluates the financial stability of banks. Depending on its preferences, the expected
12In that case, the true pt+1 differs from the banks’ forecast by ξt, which was assumed to be
around normally distributed in the range [-a; 0].
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loss of resources in case of a bank run will affect the central bank’s interest rate
decision with a weight of λ ≥ 0. The larger the parameter λ in the central bank’s
policy rule, the stronger will the central bank react to financial stability concerns in
the economy. If, however, the parameter λ is equal to zero, it will purely focus on
the stabilisation of future output and be indifferent about the occurrence of a bank
run. The central bank’s policy rule then looks as follows:
rCBt = rn + E
CB
t (Xt+1)− λ[αt−1R1 + (1− αt−1)R2 −R3]Drunt−1
It is important to note that for any λ > 0, financial stability concerns affect the cen-
tral bank’s policy rate setting asymmetrically, as they imply a reduced policy rate in
times of financial turmoil but not an increase in interest rates as long as things work
out smoothly. This notion of an asymmetrical reaction pattern is consistent with
the strategy of “benign neglect” that has been developed by Bernanke and Gertler
(1999, 2001) and which became the dominant view on financial markets among cen-
tral bankers during the pre-crisis period. This strategy has been summarised by
Bordo and Jeanne (2002) as follows: “The monetary authorities should deal with
the financial instability that may result from a crash in asset prices if and when
the latter occurs, but they should not adjust monetary policy pre-emptively in the
boom phase”. In other words, monetary policy should mitigate the consequences of
financial busts, but not react to financial booms. Studies by Borio and Lowe (2004)
as well as by Ravn (2012) provide empirical evidence for the presence of an asym-
metric response pattern of central banks to financial imbalances, with central banks
massively loosening policy in face the of financial crisis but not tightening it beyond
normal during financial booms. Thus, alternatively one can interpret the factor λ in
the model as what the Deputy General Manager of the BIS Hervé Hannoun describes
as “financial dominance”, i.e. the risk that “monetary policy becomes increasingly
dominated by short-term concerns about adverse financial market developments [...]
[which] arises when central banks factor in financial stability concerns in times of
22
1. Monetary Policy Misperception and the Risk-Taking Channel
financial bust but fail to do it in times of financial boom when financial imbalances
are building up” (Hannoun, 2012).
1.3.4 Monetary policy misperception and the risk taking
channel
As the last ingredient of the model, I now assume that the banks are aware of the
structure of the central bank’s reaction function but unsure about (1) the central
bank’s economic outlook (i.e. its forecast on the future productions shock) and
about (2) the exact weight it puts on financial stability considerations λ. Hence, if
banks observe a change in the policy rate rCBt , they cannot exactly pin down the
motive for the central bank to do so.
While the central bank’s production stabilisation does not influence the banks’ in-
vestment behaviour (as it does not systematically affect the expected profitability of
its investments), the extent of central bank reaction to bank runs λ heavily impacts
banks’ investment allocation. Full central bank liquidity support in crisis times
insures banks against the risk of illiquidity and therefore deprives them of any in-
centive to privately provide for that risk. Since the return of the risky project R2 is
higher than the return of the (liquidity) risk-free project R1, the menace of a bank
run, however, is the only thing that motivates banks to invest in safe projects in the
first place. The higher the degree of insurance provided by the central bank, the
more it pays for banks to free-ride on liquidity and to invest more heavily in risky
projects (i.e. the lower α∗ will turn out).13
In order to optimally invest the depositors’ endowment, banks therefore try to infer
the central bank’s financial stability preferences λ from observing its policy rate
setting rCBt in crisis times. Based on their knowledge of the structure of the central
13The technical proof of this result is analogous to Cao (2010).
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bank’s reaction function and their own forecasts on the future productivity shock
pet+1, they come up with a “counterfactual” interest rate, E
B
t (r
CB
t ), which they would
expect the central bank to set in case of λ = 0.
EBt (r
CB
t ) = rn + E
B
t (Xt+1)
If the central bank’s policy rate turns out lower than the banks’ counterfactual rate,
they now assign this deviation to the central bank’s financial stability motive λ.14
λ̂t =
λ
{
[αt−1R1 + (1− αt−1)R2 −R3]Drunt−1
}
+ EBt (Xt+1)− ECBt (Xt+1)
[αt−1R1 + (1− αt−1)R2 −R3]Drunt−1
As long as the banks’ assessment of the future output shock corresponds with the
central bank’s (i.e. EBt (Xt+1) = E
CB
t (Xt+1)), this procedure will give rise to an exact
estimate of the central bank’s financial stability preferences, (λ̂t = λ). However, if
the economic outlook of banks is more optimistic than the one of the central bank15,
banks will overestimate the central bank’s aversion to bank runs. The greater the
divergence in economic outlooks between the banks and the central bank (i.e. the
greater the absolute value of ξt), the greater will also be the extent of monetary
policy misperception by the banking sector. As a consequence, banks will adjust
upwards their beliefs about λ̂ — which renders them less concerned about liquidity
risk and more willing to take on additional risk. Hence, for any pet+1, they will reduce
their share of safe investments below previously optimal levels (αt < α
∗
t ) and in turn
increase their share of risky investments. As liquidity support by the central bank
can only prevent bank runs but not create “real” resources, such an overinvestment
in risky assets reduces real resources available in t+1 and thus adversely affects the
welfare in the economy.16
14Since the central bank cannot reduce its policy rate below unity, the banks set λ̂t greater or
equal to this expression in case of rCBt = 1.
15Which is the case with probability (1− π).
16There is a decisive difference between the liquidity provision from early entrepreneurs and
the central bank. While the liquidity from early entrepreneurs is backed by their (real) period t
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1.4 The pre-crisis years revisited: Monetary
policy misperception and the build-up of
financial risk
In the last years, there has been an intense discussion about whether or to what
extent the Federal Reserve’s policy can be held responsible for the massive build-up
of financial risk in the years preceding the financial crisis. John Taylor (2007, 2009,
2011) argues that from 2002 to 2006 the monetary policy of the Fed would have been
way too loose compared to historic standards. Taylor (1993) found that the Federal
Reserve’s interest rate setting since the “Great Moderation” closely resembled the
interest rate path prescribed by the following simple interest rate rule, today known
as the “Taylor rule”:
rt = r
n
t + πt + 0.5(πt − π) + 0.5(yt − yt),
where rt is the target policy rate set by the Fed, r
n
t the equilibrium real interest
rate, πt the inflation rate over the previous four quarters, π the inflation target of
the Fed and (yt − yt) the output gap measured as the deviation of real GDP from
its target rate. It is commonly assumed that both the equilibrium real interest rate
and the inflation target of the Fed is at 2%, rnt = π = 0.02.
Figure 1.3 compares the target federal funds rate actually implemented by the Fed
in the years from 2000 to 2006 with the policy rate prescribed by the original Taylor
rule for the respective years. Indeed, from 2002 onward the Taylor rule stipulated
higher policy rates than the Fed actually set. As Taylor regards the policy rates
suggested by his rule as a counterfactual for what the interest rates should have
resources (1 − γ)
{
α∗t−1R1 + (1− α∗t−1)ptR2
}
, the central bank provides liquidity in the form of
new (nominal) fiat money. So in contrast to loans from early entrepreneurs, central bank loans
will be inflationary, since they increase the total money stock of the economy without real value
creation in period t. Compare Cao and Illing (2010) and Cao and Illing (2011, 2012) for a further
discussion of that issue.
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Figure 1.3: The Taylor critique
0
2
4
6
8
P
ol
ic
y 
ra
te
 (
in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
)
2000q1 2001q1 2002q1 2003q1 2004q1 2005q1 2006q1
Years
Actual federal funds rate
Federal funds rate (original Taylor rule)
Notes — The figure illustrates the critique of John Taylor. While the black line plots the actual federal
funds rate set by the Fed, the red dotted line indicates the counterfactual policy rate that the Fed should
have set according to Taylor’s interest rate rule. As can be seen, the federal funds rate has been below the
levels prescribed by the (original) Taylor rule for the whole period from 2002 to 2006.
been had the Fed held on to the successful rule-based monetary policy of the “Great
Moderation”, he interprets the deviation from his rule as “clear evidence of monetary
excess during the period leading up to the housing boom” (Taylor, 2009). Based on
this presumption of “monetary excess”, he comes to the conclusion that “monetary
policy was a key cause of the boom and hence the bust and the crisis” (Taylor,
2009).
In January 2010, the chairman of the Fed Ben Bernanke answered this criticism by
stressing that, contrary to the accusations of John Taylor, the Fed’s monetary policy
during pre-crisis years was in fact closely in line with the suggestions of the Taylor
rule. However, since monetary policy affects inflation only with a significant lag,
effective monetary policy must take into account the forecast values of inflation and
the output gap rather than the current values as in the original Taylor rule. Given
the economic background of the early 2000s, inflation forecasts by the Fed signalled
only very low risk of inflation and even sowed fears that the United States might
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sink into deflationary territory. Hence, the policy rates prescribed by a forecast
based forward-looking Taylor rule would have been lower than the rates advised by
Taylor’s original interest rate rule.
Furthermore, while Taylor’s critique is based on the consumer price index (CPI)
measure of inflation, the Fed typically focuses on inflation as measured by the price
index for personal consumption expenditures (PCE), because it is less affected by
the imputed rent of owner-occupied housing. Since the forecasts of PCE inflation
did signal an even higher deflationary risk than CPI inflation forecasts, the choice
of the inflation measure additionally impacted the policy rate setting by the Fed
negatively. Hence, putting the Fed’s monetary policy into perspective, the claim of
an excessively easy monetary policy appears out of place (see Bernanke, 2010).
In the light of my theoretical model I claim that Bernanke’s reply is only partially
suited to clear the Fed from the accusation of complicity in the build-up of financial
imbalances. Bernanke’s argumentation just aims at the Fed’s intentions while —
as shown in the theoretical model — it is also monetary policy perception that
influences the investment behaviour of banks and financial institutions. Thus, were
market participants aware of the Fed’s motives for setting low interest rates?
A huge problem for financial markets to put the Fed’s interest rate setting into
perspective is due to the fact that the forecasts prepared for each meeting of the
FOMC (the so called Greenbook forecasts) and on which its policy rate decision
crucially hinges are not immediately available to the public but only published with
five years lag. Comparing the Greenbook inflation forecasts of the Fed with the mean
inflation forecast of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (that can be interpreted
as the “best guess” of market participants on the inflation outlook) shows that over
the period from 2002 and 2006 the public was way more optimistic about inflation
than the Fed.
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Figure 1.4: Central bank misperception in the US
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Notes — The upper figure plots the 1-year-ahead inflation forecasts by the Fed (in its Greenbook) and by
the private sector in the US for the time period from 2000 to 2006. As the Survey of Professional forecasters
only reports PCE inflation forecasts from January 2007 onwards, only Greenbook forecasts are shown for
PCE inflation rates. The lower figure compares the policy rates prescribed by the (forward-looking) Taylor
rule for the different inflation forecasts with the actual policy rates set by the Fed. All estimations of the
Taylor rule are based on the realtime output gap estimates in the Greenbook.
This gap in inflation forecasts also translates into a gap in the policy rates deemed
as adequate under current economic circumstances (according to a forward-looking
Taylor rule). Figure 1.4 highlights that, based on the CPI inflation forecasts by the
Survey of Professional Forecasters, policy rates should have been set much higher
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over the pre-crisis years. This gap amounts to more than two percentage points in
2002 and the subsequent years. Hence, by observing the policy rate setting of the
Federal Reserve, the financial sector identified an unexplainable gap between the
expected policy rate (based on public forecasts) and the actual federal funds rate,
which they possibly attributed to financial stability considerations of the Fed. Ex-
pressed in the words of the theoretical model, the financial sector raised its estimate
of the financial stability weight λ̂t — and consequently increased its exposure to
risk. Had the public been aware of the CPI inflation forecasts in the Greenbook, the
gap between the implied and the actual policy rate would have been much smaller.
Indeed, had the Fed also communicated its reliance on PCE inflation for policy rate
setting and its Greenbook PCE inflation forecasts, this gap would have almost re-
duced to zero. This might have also limited the degree of risk-taking by financial
institutions and, hence, the extent of the financial crisis.
It is a distinct feature of the time period from 2002 to 2006 that inflation forecasts
by the public (as expressed by the SPF) were continuously more optimistic than
the ones by the Fed. The difference becomes even more extreme when public infla-
tion expectations are not approximated by the SPF estimates but by the inflation
expectations of private households as collected by the University of Michigan’s Sur-
vey of Consumers (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix). Hence, I claim that monetary
policy communication, or rather the lack of it, may help to explain parts of the
increase in risk-taking observed before the start of the financial crisis. With a clear
and open monetary policy communication, such as the immediate publication of its
Greenbook forecasts, the Fed might have avoided a dangerous misinterpretation of
its policy while stabilising the staggering economy at the same time. Thus, this
study lends further support to the notion that a clear and transparent central bank
communication policy has to be a central element of any successful monetary policy.
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1.5 Conclusion
“Communication is what the receiver understands, not what the sender says”
In this chapter I have introduced monetary policy misperception as a new trans-
mission mechanism for the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Building on the
idea that in a world of imperfect information the central bank’s policy rate works as
a signal for its policy preferences, it was shown that a lack of monetary policy com-
munication can lead to a misperception of monetary policy by the financial sector.
Specifically, if the banking sector is more optimistic about the future outlook of the
economy than the central bank, it can misinterpret low policy rates as a signal for
a monetary policy that effectively cuts off some of the banks’ downside risks, which
encourages bank risk-taking.
It has further been demonstrated that this view is consistent with the build-up
of financial sector imbalances in the US. Indeed inflation forecasts by the Survey
of Professional Forecasters persistently turned out much more optimistic than the
corresponding (unpublished) inflation forecasts by the Fed over the pre-crisis years.
Based on public forecasts, financial institutions could therefore perceive the Fed’s
policy rates as too low. To the extent that financial markets attributed this gap
to financial stability concerns of the Fed, this incentivised banks to increase their
risk-taking.
Over the course of the financial crisis central banks in almost all industrialised
countries were forced to lower their policy rates to record lows. Even more than five
years after the Lehman-shock, interest rates in most of these countries are still close
to zero and expected to stay there for still some time. Given these circumstances,
the development of a sound understanding of the mechanisms at play in the risk-
taking channel is key for a lasting stabilisation of our economies. I hope that this
chapter contributes to that.
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Chapter 2
Credit Ratings and Cross-Border
Bond Market Spillovers*
2.1 Introduction
Ever since tensions began to surface in the eurozone in late 2009, the announcements
by credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the creditworthiness of member states have
continuously made the headlines and rattled financial markets. In particular, while
not specific to the ongoing crisis, the notion that rating actions pertaining to one
country might have a major impact on the yields of other countries’ sovereign bonds,
too, has regained the attention of policymakers. In fact, concerns over so-called
negative spillover effects have been running so deep that the European Commission
was at one stage considering a temporary restriction on the issuance of ratings under
exceptional circumstances (Financial Times, 2011). This provides the background
for why the Commission has just recently set up stricter rules for the agencies. In
particular, CRAs are now only allowed to issue three ratings for EU member states’
sovereign debt at pre-defined dates every year (European Union, 2013).
*This chapter is joint work with Benjamin Böninghausen.
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These considerations carry two major assumptions on the behaviour of sovereign
bond markets in the wake of rating announcements. The first assumption is that,
when a rating announcement is made for one country, there exist significant spillover
effects on other countries’ sovereign bond markets. Conditional on their existence,
the second assumption posits that such spillovers must, in one way or another,
be unwarranted to merit an intervention by the state. In more technical terms,
it suggests that spillovers are unrelated to economic fundamentals. While both
assumptions are highly policy relevant and therefore deserve close scrutiny, they are
not straightforward to test.
This chapter sets out to cleanly identify the existence of cross-border spillover effects
of sovereign rating announcements, and to establish the economic conditions under
which those effects are strongest, or which countries are affected most. To this
end, we collect an extensive dataset which comprises a complete history of both
the sovereign rating actions by the “Big Three” (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and
Fitch) and daily sovereign bond market movements for up to 73 countries between
1994 and 2011. The dataset contains substantial variation as it covers both crisis
and non-crisis periods as well as a broad set of developed and emerging countries
across all continents.
Crucially, the variation allows us to pursue a novel empirical strategy to identify
potential spillover effects. More precisely, we perform an explicit counterfactual
analysis which pits bond market reactions to small revisions in an agency’s assess-
ment of a country’s creditworthiness against bond market reactions to all other,
more major changes. As explained below, this not only helps us get around the
problems associated with a classic event-study approach in a spillover context. It
also does not require the additional assumptions made by a number of papers.
A traditional event-study procedure, where bond market movements in an estima-
tion window serve as the counterfactual for bond market reactions in the event
32
2. Credit Ratings and Cross-Border Bond Market Spillovers
window, is suitable in principle but, in a spillover context, places too high demands
on the necessary non-contamination of the estimation window. This is because, if
one entertains the possibility of cross-border spillovers after rating announcements,
each country’s bond yields are potentially affected by any sovereign rating change in
the world. The estimation window can therefore only be considered uncontaminated
if no such change has occurred anywhere. As the number of instances where this
can be ensured is extremely low, the classic event-study approach appears ill-suited
to thoroughly identify spillover effects. Hence, in this chapter, we focus on a pooled
cross section of short event windows, in which small changes of the actual rating
serve as the counterfactual for larger changes.
While some papers also investigate spillovers in a pooled cross section framework,
their analyses do not postulate an explicit counterfactual, as we do.1 Instead, they
rely on a “comprehensive credit rating” which combines two different types of rat-
ing announcements — actual rating changes and watch, or review, changes — into
a single scale. Their identification therefore depends on rather strong additional
assumptions on the relative informational content of reviews and ratings. We, how-
ever, focus solely on the class of actual rating changes. In detail, we test whether a
country’s sovereign bonds react more heavily to upgrades or downgrades elsewhere
when those are “large” — i.e., when the actual rating changes by two notches or
more. The group of “small” one-notch changes serves as the counterfactual during
that exercise. At the same time, we explicitly allow for differences in the informa-
tional content of sovereign rating changes by controlling for watch listings that may
build anticipation in the market. Moreover, we are also able to account for the fact
that an announcement is often followed by a similar one from a different agency
soon after, which may further influence the reception of the later announcements.2
1See Gande and Parsley (2005), Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), Afonso et al. (2012), and
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012).
2To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider such interactions between the major
CRAs in identifying spillover effects.
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Our findings on the existence of cross-border spillover effects point to an important
asymmetry in the sovereign debt market’s treatment of ratings. On the one hand,
we find significant spillovers in the wake of sovereign rating downgrades, which turn
out to be robust to a number of tests. On the other hand, reactions to upgrades
appear to be much more muted, if anything.
We then investigate to what extent spillovers are driven by country characteristics.
Importantly, we find that spillovers from downgrades tend to be significantly more
pronounced for countries within the same region. We proceed by testing whether
this can be explained by bilateral trade linkages, financial integration, or fundamen-
tal similarities between countries but, even after controlling for these factors, we
continue to find that belonging to a common region amplifies cross-border spillover
effects. Note that a limit to the amount of fundamentals that can be measured
implies that no study can by design “prove” that negative spillovers are unwar-
ranted in some way. At the same time, however, our findings do not suggest that
policymakers’ concerns over countries being found “guilty by association” can be
dismissed out of hand.
This chapter is related to a broad strand of literature that investigates the effects
of sovereign rating announcements on different segments of the financial markets.
The most common exercise is to conduct an event study gauging the direct impact
of rating changes on the bonds issued by the country concerned. However, there
is also a substantial body of research analysing the reaction of the country’s stock
and, more recently, of its CDS market. As a general result, this literature finds a
strong and significant impact of sovereign rating downgrades, while upgrades have
an insignificant or more limited impact (see e.g. Cantor and Packer, 1996; Larráın
et al., 1997; Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999; Brooks et al., 2004; Hooper et al., 2008;
Hill and Faff, 2010).
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Moreover, in recent years a growing body of research has specifically studied whether
sovereign rating changes also lead to spillover effects on other countries’ sovereign
bonds. Generally speaking, the literature affirms the existence of such spillovers,
meaning that a rating action on one country is found to significantly affect the
sovereign bond prices of other countries (e.g. Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Arezki
et al., 2011; De Santis, 2012). Some studies also point out that spillovers are not
limited to sovereign debt markets but that rating changes also affect foreign stock
and exchange markets (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002; Arezki et al., 2011; Alsakka
and ap Gwilym, 2012). Regarding a potential asymmetry in the spillover effects of
negative and positive rating events, the results of the literature so far remain incon-
clusive. Whereas Afonso et al. (2012) find spillovers to matter most for downgrades,
with little or no effects of sovereign upgrades, Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010) find
positive rating events to have a greater spillover effect on foreign CDS prices than
negative ones.
With the exception of Gande and Parsley (2005), these studies focus either on
spillover effects during specific regional crisis episodes3 or on an otherwise homoge-
neous sample of countries only, such as emerging countries (Kaminsky and Schmuk-
ler, 2002; Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010). In addition to some of the shortcomings
already mentioned, this leaves open the question to what extent their findings are
of more general relevance.
The chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, we describe the dataset
and highlight some important characteristics of rating announcements. Section 2.3
discusses the estimation strategy for identifying cross-border spillovers. Section 2.4
presents our empirical results and discusses their interpretation. We end with a
brief conclusion.
3See Arezki et al. (2011), Afonso et al. (2012), and De Santis (2012) for the Eurozone crisis,
Kaminsky and Schmukler (1999) for the 1997/98 Asian crisis.
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Figure 2.1: Number of sovereign bonds in the dataset
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Notes — This figure shows the scope and composition, by economic development, of the sovereign bond
sample between 1994 and 2011, highlighting a notable increase in the coverage of emerging economies over
time. Countries are classified according to the IMF World Economic Outlook.
2.2 Data
2.2.1 The dataset
For our study, we compile a broad dataset of the yields of publicly traded sovereign
bonds at daily frequency. The dataset starts in January 1994 and ends in De-
cember 2011. Since for many countries data are only available after 1994, we add
those countries’ sovereign bonds as soon as reliable information becomes available.
Whereas our dataset only comprises sovereign bonds issued by 27 countries in 1994,
this number increases to 74 countries towards the end of our sample period. This re-
flects both the increased financing needs of sovereigns and the growing prevalence of
bond issuance, as opposed to bank financing, over the last 20 years. While for 1994
sovereign bond yields are mostly available for developed countries, the availability of
emerging market bond yields picks up heavily over our sample period. Towards the
end of the period, emerging markets even account for the bulk of sovereign bonds
in the sample. Figure 2.1 illustrates the increasing scope of our dataset over time.
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Figure 2.2: Number of rated countries
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Notes — This figure shows the scope and composition, by economic development, of the sample of countries
rated by at least one of the major rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) between 1994 and 2011, with
a notable increase in the coverage of emerging economies over time. Countries are classified according to
the IMF World Economic Outlook.
In order to consider a broad spectrum of sovereign bonds, our sample draws on
data from different sources. Our preferred data source is Bloomberg, from which
we use generic 10-year yields for up to 33 countries. If data are not available on
Bloomberg, we supplement them with yields from Datastream’s 10-year Government
Bond Benchmark Index, ensuring that this does not induce structural breaks in the
series. Since sovereign bond availability for emerging markets is quite limited both
on Bloomberg and on Datastream, we also use data from the JP Morgan Emerging
Markets Bond Index Global (henceforth EMBI Global, see JP Morgan, 1999). While
bonds included in the EMBI Global have to fulfil strict requirements regarding the
availability of reliable daily prices, the average maturity of a country’s bond index
can vary remarkably from that of the other two sources. We therefore control for
maturity in all regressions. Table B.1 in the Appendix gives a detailed overview of
the sovereign bond market data included in our sample.
For the purpose of our later analysis, we compute sovereign bond spreads. The
spread is the differential of the country’s sovereign bond yield over that of a US
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Figure 2.3: Rating actions over time
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Notes — This figure shows upgrades and downgrades of developed and emerging economies made by S&P,
Moody’s, and Fitch between 1994 and 2011. Countries are classified according to the IMF World Economic
Outlook.
Treasury bond of comparable maturity. We use 10-year maturities where possible,
which is the case for the developed economies and some emerging markets. For the
other emerging economies, we rely on the EMBI Global data. As those correspond
to different maturities (depending on the average maturity of eligible instruments
a country has issued), we obtain the relevant US Treasury yields by interpolating
from the closest published yield curve rates.
Information on sovereign ratings comes from the rating agencies’ websites and in-
cludes daily information both on rating changes and on sovereign watch listings by
any of the “Big Three” (S&P, Moody’s, Fitch) from 1994 to 2011. We choose the
year 1994 as a natural starting point for our sample period since Fitch only started
to assign sovereign ratings in that year. Like the number of publicly traded sovereign
bonds, the scope and composition of countries rated by the “Big Three” changes
quite substantially during our sample period. While in 1994 only 34 sovereigns were
rated by at least one of the agencies, this number had increased to 98 countries by
2011 (see Figure 2.2).
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2.2.2 Characteristics of rating announcements
Over the sample period, we are able to consider a total of 1,097 rating changes, 635
of which were upgrades and 462 downgrades. Table B.2 in the Appendix provides a
regional breakdown. In general, one can observe a significant increase in the number
of sovereign credit ratings during our sample period, particularly in emerging market
countries.
As Figure 2.3 illustrates, rating activity is not evenly distributed over time but,
especially for downgrades, shows some hefty peaks during specific episodes of crisis.
Whereas in “normal times”, downgrades tend to be relatively scarce, a severe in-
crease can be observed in the context of the 1997/98 Asian crisis (affecting mostly
emerging countries plus South Korea and Hong Kong) and following the 2008–2011
financial and European debt crises (where for the first time advanced economies were
exposed to downgrades at a large scale). This means that similar announcements
tend to cluster around certain time periods.
In addition, it is an important stylised fact that the downgrading of a country is
frequently followed by yet another downgrade announcement for that same country
soon after. This is all the more probable because there is a strong overlap in country
coverage by the “Big Three”. Almost all countries in our sample are rated by more
than one agency only and most are even rated by all three (70 out of 98 countries at
the end of 2011). Hence, in what we term within-clustering, different agencies may
make the same announcement for a given country in short succession or even on the
same day. Figure 2.4 illustrates this issue by plotting the cumulative distribution
function and summary statistics of the number of days between similar rating actions
on the same country. As can be seen, clustering is particularly pronounced for
downgrades. In around five per cent of all cases, a downgrade on a country is followed
by another downgrade on that country within just one day. For example, in the
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Figure 2.4: Clustering of rating announcements
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Notes — This figure shows the cumulative distribution functions and summary statistics of the number
of calendar days between an upgrade (downgrade) announcement for a given country and a subsequent
upgrade (downgrade) of the same country by any agency. Information is based on the sample of 1,097
rating announcements (635 upgrades, 462 downgrades) made by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch between 1994
and 2011.
course of the Asian crisis, S&P, Fitch and Moody’s all downgraded South Korea’s
credit rating on successive days between 25 and 27 November 1997. Similarly,
during the ongoing European debt crisis, Fitch issued a downgrade for Greece on
8 December 2009. One week later, S&P downgraded the country as well, as did
Moody’s yet another six days later.
The presence of clustering might be of crucial importance when examining the
spillover effects from a rating announcement since its informational content is likely
to vary depending on whether it has been announced in isolation or just a few days
after a similar announcement by another agency. Not to control for these cases
could seriously bias estimation results for the impact of rating announcements on
sovereign bond markets.
Clustering across countries may matter, too. When CRAs change the rating of a
number of different countries in the same direction simultaneously, one needs to
control for the fact that some countries will then be both “non-event” and event
countries. Otherwise, one might erroneously detect spillovers across sovereign bond
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markets when, in fact, one is looking at own effects of ratings. This is all the more
important if the countries concerned share a common trait which leads CRAs to
make simultaneous announcements in the first place, as appears to have happened
on 3 October 2008 when Fitch downgraded Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.4 It is
therefore a major advantage of our dataset that it enables us to explicitly take into
account prior and parallel rating actions by other CRAs and on other countries.
Similarly, the informational content of a rating change might be conditional on
whether it was preceded by the respective country being put on a watch list. As the
literature on the effects of rating announcements on the refinancing conditions of the
very same country shows (e.g. Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010; Afonso et al., 2012),
rating changes are often preceded by a similar change in the market’s assessment
of sovereign risk, especially when countries have been put “on watch”, or “review”,
before.5 Ignoring these anticipation effects risks underestimating bond market re-
actions to a sovereign rating action. Since our dataset includes all sovereign watch
listings by the “Big Three”, we can directly control for a country’s watch list status
and mitigate potential problems with anticipation.
2.3 Identifying sovereign spillovers
2.3.1 Counterfactual choice and estimation strategy
The existence of rating spillover effects in the sovereign debt market requires, by
definition, that the announcement by a CRA on the creditworthiness of one country
(event country) impact significantly on the bond yields of another (non-event coun-
try). Yet, the mere observation of a change in non-event country yields when an
4Other examples may be seen in S&P’s downgrade announcements for South Korea and Taiwan
during the Asian crisis on 24 October 1997, or in Fitch lowering the ratings of Estonia, Ireland,
Latvia, and Lithuania on 8 April 2009.
5In the following, we use the two terms interchangeably. While S&P and Fitch issue watch
listings, in the Moody’s terminology those are called “reviews”.
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event-country announcement is made does not suffice to establish a causal relation
because non-event country yields might have changed regardless. Hence, the key
issue in identifying potential spillover effects is to find a suitable counterfactual.
We cannot apply the procedure traditionally used in event studies on direct an-
nouncement effects, however. This strand of literature focuses on, for instance, the
bond yield response of a sovereign that has been downgraded. In this framework,
effects are identified by the existence of abnormal returns, meaning that around the
announcement (event window), returns are significantly different from normal, as
estimated over a longer time frame before the announcement (estimation window).
In order to be a reasonable guide to normal returns, the estimation window has to
be chosen such that other events with a potentially significant impact on returns are
excluded (see e.g. MacKinlay, 1997). In other words, the counterfactual for gauging
the impact of rating announcements is “no rating change”. While this represents a
challenge in direct announcement studies already, which focus on countries in isola-
tion, the identification of spillover effects based on this counterfactual is essentially
impossible.
The reason is that, in a spillover context, we would require that there be no an-
nouncements on any rated country within the estimation window.6 There is obvi-
ously a trade-off between the length of that window and the number of announce-
ments eligible for inclusion in the estimation. However, even at a 30-day length
commonly used in sovereign event studies, which is towards the shorter end of the
event-study literature more generally, only 23 upgrades would be eligible, and 36
downgrades.
6The universe of all rated countries is the relevant benchmark when analysing potential spillover
effects in this framework. Of course, if we only required the estimation window to be free of
announcements pertaining to the non-event country, the number of events eligible for inclusion
would increase substantially. However, this would amount to assuming from the outset that only
direct effects, as opposed to spillover effects, could possibly matter, which would defy the purpose
of the investigation.
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We therefore pursue an identification strategy that does not rely on “no rating
change at all” as its counterfactual, but which discriminates between rating changes
according to their severity. More precisely, rating changes of a single notch serve as
the counterfactual for more severe changes of two notches or more.7 This approach
is implemented in the following estimation equation, which we run on upgrades and
downgrades separately:
∆Spreadn,t = α + β · LARGEe,t +RatEnve,n,t · γ +Othere,n,t · δ + ωe,n,t .
The dependent variable ∆Spreadn,t is the change in non-event country n’s bond
spread vis-à-vis the United States over the two-trading-day window [−1,+1] around
the announcement on day 0 of a change in the rating of event country e ( 6= n). The
event window length accounts for the fact that by the time a CRA announces a
rating change on day 0, markets in some parts of the world may have already
closed (asynchronous trading). Hence, any impact on those would not materialise
before day +1, and would go undetected using a shorter [−1, 0] window. The same
argument applies to rating announcements made after the exchange has closed in the
country concerned, which we cannot distinguish from those made during trading.8
The key regressor in identifying possible spillover effects is LARGEe,t, a dummy that
takes on a value of one if e’s rating is changed by two notches or more, and zero
otherwise. We thereby treat rating changes of two notches or more as one single
group. This is due to the distribution of the severity of upgrades and downgrades
in our sample, which is shown in Figure 2.5.
The vast majority of rating announcements result in a one-notch change in a coun-
try’s rating. Beyond that, we observe a significant amount of events only for changes
7See Table B.3 in the Appendix on the mapping of CRAs’ letter ratings into a linear 17-notch
scale.
8CRAs have made post-trading announcements during the Eurozone crisis, for instance (Fi-
nancial Times, 2010; Wall Street Journal, 2012). In financial markets more generally, information
which is deemed highly relevant is frequently released when exchanges are closed in order to limit
or smooth the impact on prices.
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of rating changes
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Notes — This figure shows the distribution of the severity of rating changes, measured on a 17-notch scale
(see Table B.3 in the Appendix). Numbers are based on the sample of 1,097 rating announcements (635
upgrades, 462 downgrades) made by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch between 1994 and 2011.
of two notches, while changes of three notches or more occur only very rarely. There-
fore, we do not include separate dummy variables for the latter categories but group
all rating changes of two notches or more into a single bin.
In this framework, positive (negative) spillover effects are equivalent to a drop (rise)
in the spreads of country n which is significantly more pronounced in response to
a two-or-more-notches upgrade (downgrade) of country e than to a single-notch
one. We would then expect β to be significantly negative (positive) in the upgrade
(downgrade) regressions.
This counterfactual choice also has implications for the estimation technique. Since
we do not use “no change” as the counterfactual (due to the estimation window
problem outlined above), we identify spillover effects in a cross-section of upgrades
and downgrades rather than in a true panel setup.9 We estimate the model by OLS.
At this point, it seems important to address some potential concerns about a possible
endogeneity of the large-change dummy. The implicit assumption in the above
design is that the rating announcement and its severity are not systematically related
9Thus, t denotes generic rather than actual time and can be thought of as indexing the different
rating events.
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to other spread-relevant information in the event window. Otherwise, LARGE and
the error term ω would be correlated, and β would be biased.
One concern might be, for instance, that CRAs downgrade a country instanta-
neously in reaction to “bad news” and do so by more notches for “particularly bad
news”. Note that an instantaneous response to other spread-relevant information
per se would not induce any endogeneity in our framework whereas “fine-tuning”
the severity of rating changes, conditional on an immediate response, clearly would.
Hence, we demonstrate that there is very little to suggest instantaneous-response
behaviour on the part of CRAs to begin with, and that endogeneity is therefore not
a major issue in this regard. We would like to stress two points in particular.
Restricting the event window to two days already goes a long way towards alleviating
the problem by limiting the amount of information that might potentially correlate
with the large-change dummy. In other words, the scope for other relevant news to
incite an immediate reaction from CRAs is rather small, even if such behaviour was
characteristic of rating agencies and their announcements.
In addition, the proclaimed practice and a corresponding body of empirical litera-
ture suggest otherwise. The agencies state a preference for stable ratings (see e.g.
Cantor, 2001; Cantor and Mann, 2003, 2007; Standard & Poor’s, 2010), intending
to announce a change only if it is unlikely to be reversed in the near future. This
“through the cycle” approach contrasts with a “point in time” approach in that
cyclical phenomena should not, in themselves, trigger rating changes. If CRAs ac-
tually pursued a stable rating policy, the fact that cyclical and permanent factors are
difficult to disentangle (International Monetary Fund, 2010) should imply some de-
lay between new information becoming available and an ensuing change in the credit
rating. Empirical evidence for corporate bond rating indicates that this practice is
indeed followed, thus reducing the timeliness of rating changes (Altman and Rijken,
2004; Liu et al., 2011), and that the CRAs are “slow” in processing new informa-
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tion (Löffler, 2005). This perception has also been expressed in investor surveys
(Association for Financial Professionals, 2002; Baker and Mansi, 2002). Moreover,
Sy (2004) notes for the sovereign sector that it may simply be concerns about rat-
ing changes precipitating significant increases in borrowing costs or outright crises
which make CRAs opt for somewhat less timely announcements.
A second concern might be biases arising from differences across agencies in a pooled
setup, as pointed out by Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012).10 Suppose, for example,
that the large rating changes in our sample stemmed primarily from an agency in
whose judgments the market placed more trust. Then, by pooling the announce-
ments of S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, we would be picking up differences in the cred-
ibility of these CRAs rather than identifying spillover effects across sovereign bond
markets. However, Figure B.1 in the Appendix shows that this is not very likely,
in particular for downgrades where changes of two notches or more are distributed
quite evenly across agencies: 32 for S&P, 46 for Moody’s, and 30 for Fitch.11 We
are therefore confident that our approach provides a sound identification of spillover
effects.
2.3.2 The rating environment
The rating environment may play an important role for the bond market reaction
to an upgrade or downgrade announcement. Our regressions therefore control for
a number of different rating variables, contained in RatEnve,n,t. For example, the
spillover potential of a rating action might depend on the creditworthiness of the
event country, which we proxy by the rating it held with the announcing CRA
on the day before (InitRate,t). We also include the absolute difference between
10At the same time, the authors acknowledge that studies using pooled data (e.g. Kaminsky
and Schmukler, 2002; Sy, 2004) constitute the norm in the literature as opposed to examining
rating changes by CRAs separately.
11While the picture is not quite as unambiguous for upgrades, we have already stressed in the
introduction that those results should be taken with more of a grain of salt (see next section).
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the event country’s initial rating and that of the non-event country (∆InitRate,n,t).
This is because one might expect bilateral effects to differ depending on how similar
countries are in terms of creditworthiness.
In addition, it is well established in the literature that the impact of rating an-
nouncements may vary according to whether they have been anticipated by the
market (e.g. Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999; Gande and Parsley, 2005; Ismailescu
and Kazemi, 2010). One potentially important and convenient measure of such
anticipation is whether the actual rating action has been foreshadowed by a CRA
putting the respective country on watch, or review (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002;
Afonso et al., 2012). Hence, we add a dummy that takes on a value of one if a review
in the indicated direction has been ongoing at the time of the upgrade or downgrade,
and zero otherwise (OnWatche,t).
Introducing an explicit control variable differs from Gande and Parsley (2005), who
amalgamate a country’s watch status into a “comprehensive credit rating”. More
precisely, for any given day their measure is defined as the country’s actual letter
rating on a 17-notch scale, raised (lowered) if the country is on review for an upgrade
(downgrade). Presumably due to the counterfactual issue discussed in 2.3.1, Gande
and Parsley (2005) then focus on those days as events on which there is a non-zero
change in the comprehensive credit rating. However, this identification crucially
involves additional assumptions on how changes in review status and actual rating
changes relate to one another quantitatively. Furthermore, one might argue that,
despite the potential anticipation effects of watch listings, the latter are not qual-
itatively the same as actual rating changes. In any case, our much larger sample
allows us to avoid those assumptions. We focus instead on the class of actual rating
changes and their relative strengths only while controlling for anticipation through
watch listings. This should provide for a cleaner identification of spillover effects.
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Moreover, we have shown in 2.2.2 that similar announcements by different CRAs
tend to cluster around certain dates, and that this is particularly true for rat-
ing downgrades. We account for potential clustering within countries by a vari-
able which captures the number of similar announcements made for a particu-
lar country by other agencies over a 14-day window before the respective event
(SimActsWdwEvte,t). For clustering across countries, i.e. one or more CRAs chang-
ing the rating of more than one country in the same direction simultaneously, we
include the number of similar announcements made on the same day for the “non-
event” country (SimActsDayNonEvte,t).
Finally, we add the volatility measure for the S&P 500 Index in the United States
(VIXt) to control for the “global market sentiment” in which the rating announce-
ment is made. One might, for instance, imagine that in more turbulent times (i.e.,
in which volatility is high) borrowing conditions deteriorate across the board, so
that spreads over the event window would be more likely to increase in any case. In
that sense, VIXt can be regarded as a technical control, which also adds a genuine
time component to the pooled cross sections.
Definitions and sources of the above variables are provided in Table B.4 in the
Appendix. In addition, all regressions include the vector Othere,n,t which contains
a fixed set of controls, such as event and non-event country dummies. Importantly,
we also account for common time effects in the pooled cross sections through the
inclusion of year dummies. These capture global macroeconomic trends which might
be reflected in the yields of US Treasuries and, hence, spread changes. For instance,
there may be a stronger tendency for investments to flow into the US in some
years due to a (perceived) “safe haven” status, or a “global savings glut” that has
been discussed for the early 2000s. Moreover, each regression includes the following
technical controls: the maturity of non-event country bonds in levels and squares to
account for different positions on the yield curve, a dummy for EMBI Global bond
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yields, and a dummy for spread changes that need to be measured over weekends
(as those correspond to longer intervals in terms of calendar days).
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Existence of cross-border spillover effects
Table 2.1 shows baseline estimation results on the existence of cross-border effects for
upgrades and downgrades, respectively. We start with a parsimonious specification
in column (1), which only contains our main variable of interest, the large-change
dummy LARGE and initial ratings. We then control for potential anticipation
effects from watch listings as well as clustering within and across countries in speci-
fication (2). Finally, specification (3) also accounts for global market turbulence, or
risk aversion.
The key result is that the large-change dummy has the expected sign for both up-
grades (i.e. negative) and downgrades (i.e. positive), and that it is highly significant
in both cases. Moreover, this finding appears to be remarkably robust as the co-
efficient on LARGE is very stable and retains its significance across specifications.
Comparison of the absolute coefficients, however, indicates an asymmetry in the
spillover effects induced by upgrades and downgrades, respectively. Downgrades of
two notches or more are associated with an average spread change over the event
window which exceeds that of one-notch downgrades by about two basis points. In
contrast, large upgrades are associated with spread changes that are roughly 1.2
basis points below those of one-notch upgrades. The asymmetry is also reflected in
the lower significance levels for upgrades despite a larger number of rating events
and observations. To further corroborate this, we confirm in a separate regression
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that the absolute coefficients for upgrades and downgrades are statistically different
from each other (see Table B.5 in the Appendix).12
Asymmetries in the reactions to positive and negative events have frequently been
documented in the literature. For instance, Gande and Parsley (2005) find for a
1990s sample of developed and emerging countries that negative rating events in
one country affect sovereign bond spreads in others whereas there is no discernible
impact for positive events.13 Recently, however, there has also been evidence of sym-
metric spillover reactions to sovereign rating announcements in the foreign exchange
market (Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012), or even that positive announcements in
emerging countries have both stronger direct and spillover effects in sovereign CDS
markets (Ismailescu and Kazemi, 2010).
Turning to the rating-environment controls, neither the initial rating of the event
country just before the rating announcement nor the difference in initial ratings be-
tween event and non-event country seem to play a role in terms of spillover effects.
Both coefficients are far from significant across specifications. Previous evidence on
this has been inconclusive. While Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) and Ferreira and
Gama (2007) detect stronger spillover effects in the foreign exchange and stock mar-
kets, respectively, for event countries with lower initial ratings, Gande and Parsley
(2005) find the opposite for bond market reactions (to sovereign downgrades).
We do find some evidence, though, that the impact of an actual rating change
on spreads depends on whether it has been foreshadowed by a watch listing. The
12To this end, we pool all rating changes and replace the event-window spread changes for
upgrades with their negative values for the sake of comparison. We then add a downgrade dummy
(taking on a value of one for downgrades, and zero for upgrades) to all specifications both in
levels and as interactions with the other explanatory variables. The interaction term of LARGE
with the downgrade dummy is positive and highly significant throughout, pointing to statistically
significant differences in the absolute coefficients for upgrades and downgrades.
13Similar results have been obtained regarding the direct effects in sovereign bond and CDS
markets (Larráın et al., 1997; Afonso et al., 2012), mirroring a well-established finding from event
studies on bond, stock, and CDS returns in the corporate sector (e.g. Hand et al., 1992; Goh and
Ederington, 1993; Steiner and Heinke, 2001; Norden and Weber, 2004).
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corresponding dummy, OnWatch, is signed as expected for both upgrades and down-
grades, yet there is again an asymmetry: the control variable turns out insignificant
in all upgrade specifications but significant at almost the five per cent level for
downgrades (specification (2) in Panel B). A possible explanation for this is given
by Altman and Rijken (2006). They point out that watch listings partially ease
the tension between the market’s expectation of rating stability and the demand for
rating timeliness. This suggests that watch listings contribute to the anticipation
of actual rating changes. Given that investors tend to be more concerned about
negative news, watch listings should be more important in building anticipation for
downgrades than for upgrades. Figures from our dataset support this notion. While
about a third of all downgrades are preceded by a watch listing, so are only 15 per
cent of all upgrades. Finally, it has often been noted that there is an incentive to
leak good news (e.g. Holthausen and Leftwich, 1986; Goh and Ederington, 1993;
Gande and Parsley, 2005; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012; Christopher et al., 2012),
so the relevance of watch listings in building anticipation is conceivably much lower
in the case of upgrades. We interpret the fact that our results are consistent with
this literature as reassuring in terms of the validity of the regression specifications.
Our results also point to the importance of the clustering of rating announce-
ments, especially for downgrades. While the controls for both clustering within
(SimActsWdwEvt) and across countries (SimActsDayNonEvt) are highly significant
in the downgrade regressions, the effect of across-clustering is only marginally signifi-
cant once for upgrades. This appears plausible in light of the stylised facts presented
in 2.2.2 because simultaneous announcements on several countries by one or more
agencies occur much less frequently for upgrades than for downgrades. Moreover,
the coefficients are correctly signed for both upgrades and downgrades, suggesting
that the spread-decreasing (spread-increasing) spillover effects of an upgrade (down-
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grade) are all the more pronounced when one or more upgrades (downgrades) are
announced for the “non-event” country at the same time.
A similar statement regarding the signs cannot be made with the same degree of con-
fidence for SimActsWdwEvt, which measures the number of upgrades (downgrades)
announced by other agencies over a 14-day window before the respective upgrade
(downgrade).14 While we again find strong differences in significance between up-
grades and downgrades as well as opposing signs, one need not necessarily expect
within-clustering to have an additional spread-increasing effect over the event win-
dow for downgrades. Instead, the variable might subsume two opposing effects. On
the one hand, the clustering of downgrades over a short interval could imply that
any announcement is less relevant individually. In that case, one would expect a
negative coefficient. On the other hand, clustering is much more prevalent in crisis
times (see 2.2.2). Thus, SimActsWdwEvt tends to be higher in times of market tur-
bulence or global risk aversion when spreads against a “safe-haven” investment like
US Treasuries are upward-trending, too (e.g. International Monetary Fund, 2004,
2006; Garćıa-Herrero and Ort́ız, 2006; González-Rozada and Levy Yeyati, 2008).
As this is consistent with a positive sign, the significantly positive coefficients for
downgrades suggest that we may be picking up a substantial turbulence component.
Since the literature provides little guidance on whether this is what is driving our
results, we include the S&P 500 Volatility Index (VIX ), a commonly used proxy for
global risk aversion (De Santis, 2012). As expected, its coefficient is positive and
14In choosing the window length, we follow Gande and Parsley (2005) who employ a two-week
duration for a comparable control variable. However, using a one-week or three-week window
instead does not alter the conclusions. Moreover, the reader may note that we do not report a
variable capturing similar rating announcements made on the same day by other agencies in our
baseline. This is due to the unattractive property that this variable drops out in the upgrade
regressions since there is not a single event of multiple upgrades of a country on the same day
in our sample. Therefore, in the interest of comparability, we choose not to report downgrade
regressions with that control either. These regressions show, however, that the measure is always
insignificant for downgrades, regardless of whether it is included in addition to, or as a stand-in
for, SimActsWdwEvt. All results are shown in Table B.7 in the Appendix.
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significant for both upgrades and downgrades, given the relation between market
turbulence and yield spread drift. Interestingly, the coefficient on SimActsWdwEvt
is still positive but slightly lower than before. This may be due to VIX picking
up some of the turbulence effect previously captured by SimActsWdwEvt. Hence,
there is indeed evidence that clustering may also reduce the spillover relevance of
individual rating events that take place in a period of many similar announcements
by other CRAs.
Finally, we subject our baseline regressions to a number of robustness checks. In
doing so, we focus on downgrades because these are significantly more relevant from
a policy perspective than upgrades and, as will be shown in 2.4.2, the findings on
the latter should be taken with a grain of salt. The results of our robustness checks
are reported in Table B.6 in the Appendix.
First, we address extreme rating events. One might be concerned, for instance, that
grouping all downgrades of two notches or more into a single bin could obscure the
impact of a few very severe rating changes that might be driving our results (see
Figure 2.5). However, this is not the case as dropping downgrades of four notches
or more and three notches or more, respectively, leaves the findings unchanged.
Second, we ensure that the results on negative spillovers are not merely the product
of specific crisis episodes, namely the Eurozone crisis of 2010/11 and the Asian
financial crisis of 1997/98. Again, our results appear to be more general as the key
coefficient of interest remains robust to controlling for these two crises.
Third, in 2.3.1 we have already argued that an estimation bias due to different
degrees of trust being placed in the three CRAs is unlikely by pointing to the
distribution of the severity of rating changes across agencies in Figure B.1 (see the
Appendix). However, the figure also shows that S&P stands out as the agency which
is far less likely than the other two CRAs to issue a large downgrade conditional
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on announcing any downgrade at all (only 32 out of 210 negative announcements).
By virtue of their relative rarity, S&P’s large downgrades might hint at particularly
strong deteriorations in a country’s creditworthiness and thus incite especially strong
reactions as well. It could therefore be a concern that those might account for our
baseline result.15 Yet, controlling for this does nothing to alter the conclusion of
significant cross-border spillover effects of sovereign rating downgrades.
Finally, in 2.3.1 we have also dwelled quite extensively on literature which sug-
gests that CRAs do not generally react instantaneously to other spread-relevant
information. For lack of immediate-response behaviour in the first place, we then
reasoned that it is even more unlikely that the agencies should “fine-tune” the sever-
ity of their rating changes to such information. However, concerns were pointed out
to us that some large downgrades may have been motivated by particularly ad-
verse spread developments in the run-up to the announcement.16 Note that because
we look at spillover effects on other countries, it is immaterial whether spreads
in the event country also continue their particularly strong increase from prior to
such announcements over the two-day event window. To interfere with our estima-
tion results and bias the coefficient on LARGE upwards, not only would negative
spread developments in the event country need to be at least partly representative
of those in non-event countries, but spreads in the latter would also need to widen
particularly strongly during the event window. Moreover, as a global turbulence
15Moreover, some studies, such as Ismailescu and Kazemi (2010), continue to single out S&P and
ignore other CRAs’ announcements on the grounds that early research into sovereign credit rating
announcements found S&P’s to be less anticipated (e.g. Reisen and von Maltzan, 1999; Gande and
Parsley, 2005). It is worth emphasising, though, that an agency such as Fitch, for example, only
entered the business as late as 1994. Therefore, not only were there no corresponding rating actions
to examine by earlier studies to begin with, but it is also quite conceivable that part of S&P’s
alleged special position was eroded over time. The summary of more recent research provided in
Alsakka and ap Gwilym (2012) also suggests that there is no single agency whose announcements
are generally more relevant than those of the other two CRAs.
16The ratings rationale provided by Moody’s for its four-notch downgrade of Portugal on 5 July
2011 may be viewed as a case in point, which names as the “first driver informing [the] downgrade
... the increasing probability that Portugal will not be able to borrow at sustainable rates in the
capital markets” (emphasis added). One could interpret this to refer to a widening of spreads prior
to the rating change.
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component, VIX should already capture some common component of spread devel-
opments across countries. We nonetheless also run a regression which includes as an
additional control variable the change in the event country’s spread over the 14-day
window prior to the event. While data limitations on event country spreads allow
us to do so for only about 60 per cent of the original downgrades, our key finding
continues to hold.
2.4.2 Spillover channels
After providing evidence for the existence of spillover effects in the sovereign bond
market, in particular for downgrades, we now turn to potential channels of those
spillovers. While the regressions presented so far control for a multiplicity of factors
pertaining to event and non-event countries on their own, they do not — with the
exception of ∆InitRat — account for bilateral characteristics of event and non-event
countries. However, bond market reactions in the wake of rating announcements in
other countries might differ depending on similarities and bilateral linkages, which
may be highly relevant from the perspective of policymakers.
We therefore augment our final baseline specification (column (3) in Table 2.1) by
whether the event and non-event country belong to the same geographical region
(Region), whether they are members of a common major trade bloc (TradeBloc),
and the importance of the event country as an export destination for the non-event
country (ExpImpEvt). We also account for the degree of financial integration by the
event and non-event country’s capital account openness (CapOpenEvt and CapOpen-
NonEvt). Finally, we consider the size of the event country’s GDP (SizeEvt) as well
as differences between event and non-event countries in terms of GDP (∆Size) and
trend growth (∆TrendGrowth). Definitions and sources for these variables are also
reported in Table B.4 in the Appendix. The estimation results are shown in Tables
2.2 and 2.3.
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There is again a notable asymmetry between the findings on upgrades and those on
downgrades. This applies to both the results on the potential channels themselves
and to the impact that the inclusion of additional controls has on the robustness
of our baseline findings. Whereas the results for downgrades are highly stable and
intuitive, they paint a more nuanced picture for upgrades.
In more detail, we find consistently that spillover effects in the case of downgrade
announcements are significantly stronger within the same region than to countries
outside it (see Table 2.3). The coefficient on Region has the correct sign, indicating
that borrowing costs increase by up to almost four basis points more for non-event
countries in the same region as the event country than for those outside it. Our
findings appear plausible since countries in the same geographical region are more
likely to share institutional or cultural characteristics and to have important real and
financial links to one another. Apart from fundamental factors, a more mundane
explanation might posit that financial markets simply find non-event countries from
the same region “guilty by association”. The results are also in line with a number
of studies which focus on one or more particular regions from the start (e.g. Arezki
et al., 2011; Alsakka and ap Gwilym, 2012; De Santis, 2012). Surprisingly, we
obtain positive coefficients for upgrades in Table 2.2 as well, which would suggest
that those are less likely to induce spillovers within than across regions. While one
could imagine that belonging to a particular region does not matter for upgrade
announcements due to an asymmetric perception by investors, the fact that the
coefficients are often significant is not easily rationalised. On a positive note, though,
the magnitude for upgrades is only about a third of that for downgrades — and
statistical significance is also lower. Therefore, in the interest of comparability and
as an important economic control, we retain Region in all specifications.
The two trade controls, i.e. common membership in a major trade bloc (Trade-
Bloc) and the non-event country’s ratio of exports to the event country to domestic
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GDP (ExpImpEvt), are signed as expected throughout, pointing to more pronounced
spillover effects for both upgrades and downgrades when such linkages exist, or when
they are stronger. However, they are only mildly significant once for upgrades (see
specification (7) in Table 2.2). Moreover, the stability in magnitude and significance
of Region upon inclusion of the trade variables, in particular for downgrades, seems
to indicate that stronger spillover effects within regions cannot easily be explained
by real linkages.17
Apart from real linkages, we would ideally also like to control directly for bilateral
financial linkages, e.g. the exposure of non-event country investors to event country
sovereign bonds. Unfortunately, even use of the most comprehensive data from
the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey leads to a massive reduction
in the number of observations and major selection effects along the time series and
country dimensions. This renders virtually impossible any comparison with the
baseline results.
However, to the extent that trade also captures a notable portion of variation in
bilateral asset holdings, our findings for real linkages also hold for financial linkages.
As shown by Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007), there is indeed strong evidence that
trade is a powerful determinant of bilateral (bank) asset holdings.18 The disad-
vantage of using trade as a proxy for financial linkages, though, is that we cannot
discriminate between the effects of real and financial linkages.
To get an idea of the distinct impact of financial linkages, we therefore approximate
financial integration by the degree of the event and non-event country’s capital
17The fact that the correlation of the two trade variables with the region control is low does
not support multicollinearity as a technical explanation for this result. Moreover, replacing Ex-
pImpEvt by other proxies for bilateral trade does not change the picture either (see Table B.8 in
the Appendix).
18In addition, through its correlation with FDI, trade may proxy for cross-country bank exposure
since bank lending may follow domestic companies when those set up operations abroad (see e.g.
Goldberg and Saunders, 1980, 1981; Brealey and Kaplanis, 1996; Yamori, 1998).
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account openness as measured by the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito, 2006).19
While this index cannot be used to gauge the effects of bilateral financial linkages,
it is still interesting in its own right to look at and control for level effects. The results
show that the event country’s capital account openness tends to significantly amplify
cross-border spillover effects. Since bonds of financially open countries should be
more likely to be held by foreign investors, this result is highly intuitive.
The evidence on the remaining potential channels is succinctly summarised for down-
grades. In no specification do the size of the event country’s GDP (SizeEvt), its
increment over that of the non-event country (∆Size), or differences in trend growth
between event and non-event countries (∆TrendGrowth) turn out to be significant
determinants of the strength of bond market spillovers. At the same time, all results
from the baseline and augmented baseline regressions (columns (1) and (2) in Table
2.3) prove remarkably stable in terms of both magnitude and significance.
This contrasts with the corresponding findings for upgrades. On the one hand, we
obtain a number of interesting results for the size and growth controls. On the
other hand, the augmented regressions raise some doubts on our main variable of
interest, LARGE, in terms of statistical significance. The latter alternates between
specifications and vanishes in some, yet in view of the considerably stronger baseline
results for downgrades, this is not entirely surprising. It merely serves to underscore
the asymmetry that exists between positive and negative rating changes. However,
this also means that the evidence on the potential channels for upgrades should be
taken with a grain of salt.
In this regard, the most interesting result is probably the observation that, given the
event country’s size and initial rating, positive spillovers are larger the smaller the
non-event country relative to the event country (∆Size). The magnitude of the co-
19We choose this index due to its broad coverage over time, which allows us to maintain com-
parability with the baseline results. The index has also been used extensively in recent literature
(e.g. Fratzscher, 2012; Hale and Spiegel, 2012; Frankel et al., 2013).
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efficient suggests that non-event countries which are half (two-thirds) the size of the
event country experience an additional positive spillover effect of about four (two)
basis points, as compared to non-event countries as large as the event country.20
While the effect appears to be relatively small, its direction is still interesting, in
particular when viewed in conjunction with the fact that, across the whole sample,
larger and more highly rated countries induce smaller spillovers (columns (5) to (7)
in Table 2.2). This would be consistent with a world in which positive spillover
effects matter primarily within a group of small developed and emerging countries
but less so within a group of large, developed countries, and in which the latter have
little impact on the former. The insignificance of the absolute difference in trend
GDP growth rates between event and non-event countries (∆TrendGrowth) as a
further measure of differences in economic development does nothing to contradict
this interpretation. In view of the generally more ambiguous results for upgrades,
however, we do not wish to overemphasise this point.
2.4.3 Discussion
Our results can be condensed into the following stylised facts. First, there is strong
evidence of statistically significant, negative spillover effects of downgrade announce-
ments. This result proves highly robust to controlling for anticipation through watch
listings and the clustering of rating announcements. Second, negative spillover ef-
fects are more pronounced among countries in a common region, which cannot be ex-
plained by measurable fundamental links and similarities between countries. Third,
reactions to upgrades are, if anything, much more muted than for downgrades, sug-
gesting important asymmetries in the sovereign bond market’s treatment of the two
20∆Size is defined as the difference between the event and non-event country’s log GDPs or,
equivalently, the log of the ratio of the two GDP levels. Therefore, a decrease in relative non-event
country size by half (two-thirds) amounts to an increase in ∆Size of about one hundred (fifty) per
cent. With an absolute coefficient of roughly 0.04, the (semi-elasticity) marginal effects therefore
obtain as four and two basis points, respectively.
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types of announcements. Fourth, evidence on the channels behind positive spillover
effects, if any, offers a more complex picture and appears relatively ambiguous.
Which conclusion to draw from this? To begin with, there is a strong case for the
notion that negative sovereign rating announcements, i.e. those of most concern to
policymakers, do matter in inducing spillovers across markets. Such is the outcome
of the explicit identification strategy used in this chapter, which demonstrates that,
all other things equal, large downgrades of two notches or more cause larger hikes in
spreads than small one-notch downgrades. This suggests a role for CRAs and their
actions in sovereign bond markets, be it through the revelation of new information
on creditworthiness which acts as a “wake-up call” for investors to reassess funda-
mentals in other countries (Goldstein, 1998), or simply by providing a coordinating
signal that shifts expectations from a good to a bad equilibrium (Masson, 1998;
Boot et al., 2006).
However, a major regulatory focus on the activities of CRAs would also require
negative spillover effects of substantial economic magnitude. In this chapter, we find
the incremental impact of large downgrades to be a little over two basis points, which
may appear limited at first glance. Yet, it is important to note that this does not
represent the total effect that policymakers would be concerned about. This total
effect can be thought of as consisting of a “base effect” that small downgrades have,
compared to a benchmark scenario of no downgrades anywhere, plus an additional
impact for large downgrades — which is what we measure. Of course, the reason we
focus on the latter lies in the impossibility of cleanly identifying the “base effect” of
rating changes unless one rules out the existence of rating-induced spillovers from the
beginning (see the discussion in 2.3.1). Nonetheless, the total effect is conceivably
a multiple of the one we estimate. Suppose the “base effect” were only twice as
large as the incremental one we measure. Then, the implied total effect would
already amount to approximately six basis points. To put this into perspective, the
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average sovereign bond spread vis-à-vis US Treasuries at the time of the downgrade
announcements in our sample is 3.25 per cent, or 325 basis points. While the total
effect of downgrades is relatively small in comparison, one has to bear in mind that
governments often need to refinance large amounts of debt, which magnifies the
impact of even small spread differences. Moreover, there is still a regional effect
of up to four basis points on top of that, suggesting that concerns about negative
spillovers in the sovereign debt market should not be lightly dismissed.
Finally, from a policymaker’s point of view, the finding that the increased strength
of negative spillovers within regions cannot be explained away by measurable link-
ages and similarities between countries might also be a cause for concern. Even
though limited data availability precludes an all-encompassing analysis of poten-
tial channels, there is little to suggest that one can comfortably rule out that some
countries are found “guilty by association” with the event country. Moreover, such
behaviour on the part of investors would likely extend to their reactions to news
other than rating announcements. While it is hard to see an obvious remedy, the
potential problem would seem to be much more general and, above all, rooted in
investor behaviour. Hence, it is not clear that putting the primary emphasis on
CRAs will prove effective in this regard.
2.5 Conclusion
Concerns about negative spillovers across sovereign debt markets in the wake of
sovereign rating changes have recently resurfaced on the agenda of policymakers. In
this chapter, we study the existence and potential channels of such spillover effects.
More specifically, we avail of an extensive dataset which covers all sovereign rating
announcements made by the three major agencies and daily sovereign bond market
movements of up to 73 developed and emerging countries between 1994 and 2011.
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Based on this, we propose an explicit counterfactual identification strategy which
compares the bond market reactions to small changes in an agency’s assessment of
a country’s creditworthiness to those induced by all other, more major revisions. In
doing so, we account for a number of factors that might impact on the reception of
individual announcements.
We find strong evidence in favour of negative cross-border spillovers in the wake
of sovereign downgrades. At the same time, there is no similarly robust indication
as to positive spillovers since reactions to upgrades are much more muted at best,
which points to an important asymmetry in the sovereign debt market’s treatment
of positive and negative information. Regarding the channels of negative spillover
effects, our results suggest that those are more pronounced for countries within the
same region. Strikingly, however, this cannot be explained by fundamental linkages
and similarities, such as trade, which turn out to be insignificant.
Therefore, there is reason to believe that policymakers’ concerns about negative
spillover effects are not unfounded. In fact, the lack of power of a set of fundamentals
in explaining the added regional component may reinforce, or give rise to, concerns
about the ability of investors to discriminate accurately between sovereigns. This
could also be of more general interest because such behaviour is likely to carry over
to reactions to various kinds of non-CRA news in other markets and sectors, too.
Hence, important though they are, a sole focus on CRAs and their actions might
be missing a bigger picture.
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Chapter 3
The Output Costs of Soft and
Hard Sovereign Defaults*
3.1 Introduction
It is widely recognised that sovereign debt crises have adverse economic effects. But
how costly is a sovereign default? Answering this question is of crucial importance
both for the theory of sovereign debt1 and for policymakers in crisis situations. Past
empirical research on the costs of default has commonly relied on a binary debt
crisis measure of default versus non-default. In this chapter, we propose the use of
more continuous crisis measures to study the output costs of default. Specifically,
we distinguish between cases of “hard” and “soft” default based on a new procedu-
ral index that tracks a government’s payment and negotiation behaviour vis-à-vis
foreign creditors during a default spell. We also differentiate between defaults using
an outcome measure of debt crises, namely the size of creditor losses or “haircuts”
captured at the end of a debt crisis. Our results show that the output loss during
*This chapter is joint work with Christoph Trebesch.
1Since Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), assumptions on the cost of default have shaped the setup
and results of sovereign debt models in a fundamental way (see the surveys by Eaton and Fernandez,
1995; Panizza et al., 2009).
68
3. The Output Costs of Soft and Hard Sovereign Defaults
a debt crisis is much deeper for episodes of “hard” defaults. This suggests that not
only the incidence of default matters, as implied by much of the previous literature,
but also its severity.
Our research design is motivated by the existence of striking differences between
debt crisis events, as documented in case studies by Roubini and Setser (2004)
or Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2007). On the one hand, there are cases such
as Russia during the 1990s, Ecuador 2008/2009 or Argentina 2002-2005, in which
governments opted for a unilateral payment moratorium, engaged in anti-creditor
rhetoric, and at times even refused to negotiate with their foreign banks and bond-
holders. These confrontational defaults also involved high creditor losses (haircuts)
of up to 70%. On the other hand, there are debt crises that got resolved in a consen-
sual manner, with close creditor consultations, little (or no) missed payments, and
low haircuts of around 10-20%. Recent examples include the Ukraine in 1999/2000
and Uruguay in 2003.
The aim of this chapter is to take the heterogeneity in sovereign debt crises seriously
and to empirically assess whether the output costs of default differ depending on
the type of default. We proceed in two steps: In the first step, we analyse the link
between what we call government “coerciveness” towards creditors and GDP growth
during the default episode. We measure “coerciveness” based on a new database on
debt crisis resolution processes, which categorises a government’s debtor policies on
a scale from 1 (very creditor-friendly) to 10 (very confrontational). This dataset,
compiled by Enderlein et al. (2012), tracks government actions towards private
external creditors throughout a debt crisis along nine dimensions of payment and
negotiation behaviour. The indicator of coerciveness is coded on an annual basis and
shows a strong variation not only within but also across debt crises and defaulting
countries. This is advantageous compared to a simple default dummy, since it allows
us to exploit both the time variation and the cross-sectional variation in debtor
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behaviour. In a second step, we build on the database of investor losses by Cruces
and Trebesch (2013), and investigate how the haircut size is related to post-crisis
GDP growth. With this two-step approach we are able to trace out the output
effects of hard and soft defaults over the whole default episode, starting from the
first missed payments to the conclusion of the debt restructuring and the subsequent
post-default period.
We find that coercive government behaviour during default is associated with a much
steeper drop in output. On average, coercive or “hard” defaults see a significantly
lower GDP growth of up to six percentage points annually compared to “soft”
defaults in which the government opted for a consensual stance. Renegotiation
patterns are thus an important predictor for growth during debt crises, which can
take up to 15 years. However, we do not find a robust relationship between the size
of haircuts at the end of a debt crisis and the subsequent growth performance.
The main challenges for interpreting these results are (i) omitted variable bias, as
common shocks could affect both output and coerciveness/haircuts, and (ii) reverse
causality, since changes in output could explain the type of default and not vice
versa. In the main body of the chapter, we do our best to address these chal-
lenges: We account for a battery of control variables, including the set of macro
controls commonly used in the growth literature, but also crisis duration, banking
and currency crises, and country ratings. We further include lagged growth as well
as country and time fixed effects in our regression and control for the presence of
country-specific time trends. Besides, we test the influence of lagged growth on gov-
ernment behaviour and find that it is not a good predictor for current coerciveness.
Moreover, we attempt to tease out the surprise component in debtor coerciveness
by using start-of-year country credit ratings as well as lagged coerciveness as pre-
dictors and conclude that it is unexpected debtor coerciveness which explains the
significance of our main coefficient of interest. All in all, we find little evidence for
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reverse causality and have a hard time identifying a confounder that can explain
away our main result. The correlation between the “type” of default and output
performance is quantitatively large and proves to be highly robust during defaults.
Our findings have important implications for theory. Specifically, we shed doubt
on a widely used assumption of modern dynamic general equilibrium papers with
defaultable debt, namely that sovereign defaults trigger a lump-sum output cost
which is fixed and does not depend on the share of debt repudiated (see e.g. Aguiar
and Gopinath, 2006; Arellano, 2008; Yue, 2010; Arellano and Ramanarayanan, 2012;
Hatchondo and Martinez, 2012; Hatchondo et al., 2013; Aguiar et al., 2013, to name
just a few). For calibration purposes, this literature has often assumed a fixed output
loss of two per cent in default years.2 Our results indicate that the output costs of
default may in fact be much higher or lower than that, depending on the severity
of default. We thus provide empirical backing for recent contributions in which the
costs of a default increase in the scope of default or in the size of (expected) haircuts
(see in particular Bolton and Jeanne, 2007; Adam and Grill, 2013; Arellano et al.,
2013).3 This notion of proportional default costs shapes modelling in a fundamental
way and also has “far-reaching implications for policy analysis”, as emphasised by
Corsetti and Dedola (2012).
Regarding the empirical literature, we are among the first to account for the magni-
tude and the severity of sovereign defaults. Several earlier studies have emphasised
the important differences across debt crises events. Obstfeld and Taylor (2003),
for example, distinguish between “partial” and “full” defaulters, while Eichengreen
(1991) refers to “light” versus “heavy” defaults. However, no contribution has yet
2This figure has been used with reference to Sturzenegger (2004), who run cross-country and
panel growth regressions for the period between 1974 and 2000.
3Earlier seminal papers with proportional output costs are Calvo (1988) and Bulow and Rogoff
(1989). In the corporate context, proportional default costs are more established, see e.g. Zame
(1993) and Dubey et al. (2005).
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quantitatively analysed how different crisis characteristics affect a country’s GDP
growth in a large sample of countries and crises.
Previous papers on the output costs of debt crises by Sturzenegger (2004), Boren-
sztein and Panizza (2009), and Furceri and Zdzienicka (2012) all use a binary de-
fault measure by Standard & Poor’s and conclude that defaults are associated with a
steep drop in output, with estimates ranging from two to six percentage points lower
growth, depending on the sample and estimation method. De Paoli et al. (2009)
show, that the fall in output is particularly large when defaults are accompanied by
banking and/or currency crises. Panizza et al. (2009) use quarterly data to show
that, on average, output contractions precede defaults and that growth picks up af-
ter the quarter in which default occurs. To our knowledge, there is barely any work
on the real effects of debt renegotiation patterns during and after default. Thus,
we add to this literature by conducting the first in-depth study on debtor country
behaviour (the “type” of default) and the associated output dynamics during and
after a debt crisis. In line with Cruces and Trebesch (2013), we conclude that it is
crucial to account for the scope of default when studying its consequences. A di-
chotomous categorisation may be overly simplistic and can introduce measurement
error.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 frames our analysis,
describes our empirical strategy and discusses the construction of our coerciveness
and haircut measure. In section 3.3, we analyse the link between a government’s
payment and negotiation behaviour and GDP growth during the default episode,
while section 3.4 investigates how the haircut size is related to post-crisis growth.
Section 3.5 concludes.
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3.2 Theory and Data
3.2.1 Theoretical considerations
Why do sovereign defaults result in output losses? And why should output losses be
higher in debt crises with high haircuts and confrontational government behaviour?
Theory points to several potential channels. Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) famously
propose that a default will result in exclusion from international capital markets,
which undermines a country’s ability to smooth out consumption and should hence
result in lower output during crises. Recent contributions show that sovereign de-
faults also negatively affect the access of private firms to foreign credit, which should
further intensify this effect (Arteta and Hale, 2008; Mendoza and Yue, 2012). Bulow
and Rogoff (1989) stress the role of sanctions, such as trade sanctions or legal sanc-
tions, which increase in the share of debt that is repudiated, resulting in a disruption
of goods and asset trade.
Another branch of the literature emphasises the role of reputational spillovers and
signalling. Grossman and van Huyck (1988) suggest that lenders differentiate be-
tween excusable defaults and cases of inexcusable debt repudiation. High creditor
losses and coercive debt policies that are not justified by a bad state of the economy
could thus lead to a deterioration of country reputation and, thereby, to “collat-
eral damage” on the domestic economy and lower output. Relatedly, Cole and
Kehoe (1997, 1998) develop a model of generalised reputation. Governments who
are deemed untrustworthy in one area will also be seen as untrustworthy in other
fields. Confrontational behaviour in the sovereign debt arena could therefore curb
foreign investments, capital flows or the country’s standing in international negoti-
ations, with adverse growth effects. More recently, Sandleris (2008) argues that the
repayment behaviour of sovereigns acts as a signal on the country’s fundamentals
and on the government’s willingness (or ability) to undertake reforms and to protect
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property rights. Expropriative debt policies could thus affect agents’ beliefs both at
home and abroad, leading to less investments and lower growth.
Based on these theoretical considerations, the chapter’s central hypothesis is that
high (expected) haircuts and confrontational debt policies vis-à-vis foreign creditors
create “collateral” damage on the domestic economy, resulting in lower growth. To
test this hypothesis, a key challenge is to control for potential confounding factors
that influence both output and the type of default, as well as to account for po-
tential reverse causality. In the main body of this chapter, we spend a lot of effort
to approach these challenges. As in most of the earlier literature, we will however
not analyse the underlying channels at work, meaning that we do not test whether
the observed link between default and growth can be explained by sanctions, rep-
utational damage and/or signalling. The simple reason is that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to tease out the role of reputation or signalling from country-level data.
3.2.2 Empirical approach
Existing work on the link between default and growth, such as Sturzenegger (2004)
and Borensztein and Panizza (2009), has regressed the annual growth rate of real
GDP per capita on a dummy for the start of default, lagged values of this dummy,
and a set of standard control variables as used in the cross-country growth literature.
We argue that a binary categorisation of sovereign defaults is too simplistic as it
hides the substantial variation in crisis characteristics. We therefore propose the
usage of more continuous measures and run a horse-race between those and the
binary default dummy. In addition, we seek to trace the relationship between debtor
default behaviour and GDP over the entire default episode — from the start of
default, over the whole debt renegotiation period (which lasts more than five years
on average) and up to five years after the crisis ends with a final restructuring.
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We distinguish between “hard” and “soft” defaults by building on two distinct em-
pirical measures on the heterogeneity of debt crisis events. The first measure is the
index of debtor coerciveness, which is procedural and captures differences in crisis
characteristics during default (see subsection 3.2.3 for details). The second mea-
sure is the main outcome of debt renegotiations, namely the size of creditor losses
or “haircuts” implied in the debt restructuring agreement. We focus on “final” re-
structurings as defined by Cruces and Trebesch (2013), meaning those restructurings
that cured the debt crisis events, with no new default in the following four years
(see subsection 3.2.4 for details).
An advantage of the index of debtor coerciveness is that it varies on an annual
basis and is observable throughout the debt crisis. In contrast, haircuts are only
observable once, namely at the end of debt renegotiations, which can take many
years. An illustrative example is the default of Peru, which lasted from the mid-
1980s until the late 1990s, when the crisis got resolved with the Brady deal of 1997.
During these 15 years, Peru’s debt policy varied substantially. The government’s
stance vis-à-vis its foreign banks was very confrontational after President Garcia
imposed a unilateral debt moratorium following his inauguration in 1985, but the
debt policy became more cooperative after President Fujimori took over in 1990.
This variation in debtor policy is captured accurately by the coerciveness index,
while a haircut is only available for the end of default in 1997. In principle, one can
make the argument that creditors quickly form expectations on the scope of losses
which they are likely to suffer and that this expected haircut will be roughly in line
with the actual final haircut. However, for longer crises, such the one in Peru, it is
far-fetched to use the 1997 haircut as a proxy for loss expectations in the mid- or
late 1980s. We therefore use both the procedural index and the haircut estimates
for our analysis. Specifically, we rely on the coerciveness index during the default
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Figure 3.1: Stylised timeline of a debt crisis and structure of this chapter
Notes — This figure illustrates a stylised timeline of a debt crisis and shows in which section of this chapter
we plan to address each stage.
period, but use haircuts as our preferred measure for the analysis of post-default
growth.
The main body of this chapter proceeds as follows: In section 3.3, we analyse
the relationship between “hard” and “soft” defaults and GDP growth during the
default and debt renegotiation period, using the index of our coerciveness index
as our preferred measure. In section 3.4 we then analyse the post-default period,
now relying on haircuts as our measure to classify defaults. Our research agenda is
illustrated in Figure 3.1, based on a stylised debt crisis timeline.
3.2.3 The coerciveness index
In order to classify the payment and negotiation behaviour of governments, we
rely on an index constructed by Enderlein et al. (2012). This “index of debtor
coerciveness” (or “coerciveness index” hereafter) was coded from quantitative as well
as qualitative sources, including 20,000 pages of articles form the financial press. The
idea of categorising different types of debtor behaviour towards creditors is not new.
Authors like Aggarwal (1996), Andritzky (2006), Cline (2004) or Roubini (2004) all
suggested that debt policies and restructuring processes vary on a spectrum from
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“soft” to “hard” or from “voluntary” to more “involuntary”. However, Enderlein
et al. (2012) provide the first comprehensive and systematic dataset suitable for
econometric analysis.
The coerciveness index captures coercive measures which governments take against
their private external creditors during the default episode. The index is coded for
debt distress episodes only and consists of nine sub-indicators, each of which gauges
observable government actions vis-à-vis foreign banks and bondholders. Each sub-
indicator is a dummy variable, which is coded as one if the respective action by the
government can be observed in a given year, and zero otherwise. The sub-indicators
can be grouped into two broad categories: (1) “Indicators of Payment Behaviour”,
capturing steps by the government that directly impact on financial flows towards
international banks or bondholders, and (2) “Indicators of Negotiation Behaviour”,
measuring negotiation patterns and aggressive rhetoric of governments.
Enderlein et al. (2012) give the exact definitions of and the theoretical rationales for
each sub-indicator and provide the detailed coding procedures, descriptive statistics
and stylised facts on the index. Here, we summarise each sub-indicator briefly.
The indicators of government payment behaviour during debt crises are the following:
1. Payments missed? (yes/no): Are there any payments missed by the sovereign
(principal and/or interest)? Although arrears occur in most debt crisis episodes,
there have been many cases in which countries restructure their debt pre-
emptively, without missing payments. Examples include Chile, Algeria and
Uruguay in the 1980s and, more recently, Ukraine 1998-2000 or the Dominican
Republic 2005.
2. Unilateral payment suspension? (yes/no) The next sub-indicator asks
whether the sovereign did unilaterally suspend payments to its creditors, i.e.
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without a previous agreement with and/or notification of creditors. This in-
dicator enables us to differentiate between outright defaults on the one hand
and “negotiated defaults” on the other. Most defaults have been unilateral,
but roughly one third of all debt suspensions were negotiated, e.g. in the form
of a 3-month debt roll-over or a temporary suspension of principal payments.
3. Full moratorium, incl. interest payments? (yes/no): Is there a full
moratorium of debt payments that extends also to the sovereign’s payments of
interest on government debt? The Institute of International Finance highlights
in its “Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring” the
importance of partial debt service and full continuation of interest payments
as a sign of good faith (cp. Annex 1 of Institute of International Finance,
2013). A complete suspension of interest payments therefore constitutes a
strong signal of the government’s unwillingness to pay. As such, this only
happens pretty rarely and is the case in only around a quarter of all annual
crisis observations.
4. Freeze on foreign assets? (yes/no): Does the government issue emergency
decrees that effectively lead to a freeze of creditor assets in the country? As
this is a particularly tough and aggressive measure by the government, this
is observed only on rare occasions. Examples include Argentina in 1982 and
2002, which set up capital controls that prohibited private Argentine firms
to make any debt repayments to foreign creditors, and the Ukraine, which
enacted harsh exchange controls during its debt crisis at the end of the 1990’s.
The indicators of government negotiation behaviour during debt crises are:
5. Breakdown or refusal of negotiations? (yes/no): Does the government
refuse to engage in negotiations with its creditors and/or do government ac-
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tions lead to a breakdown of debt negotiations for a period of three months or
more in a given year? Regular and continuous dialogue between the sovereign
and its creditors are usually considered to be a key ingredient for the consen-
sual solution of a debt crisis. Nonetheless, negotiation delays or negotiation
stalemates are quite common and take place in almost half of all crisis years.
6. Explicit moratorium or default declaration? (yes/no): Does a key gov-
ernment actor (president, prime minister, minister of finance or economy, the
country’s chief negotiator or the president of the central bank) officially pro-
claim the decision to default? Such official default declarations occur quite
rarely. However, once such a public proclamation is made, this is clear sign
of an escalation of the crisis as it comes close to being a “declaration of war”
against the country’s creditors.
7. Explicit threats to repudiate on debt? (yes/no): Does a key government
actor publicly threaten to repudiate from debt? While this is very uncommon,
examples include Chile in 1986, where president Pinochet used the threat of
debt repudiation as a reaction to US pressure on human rights and, most re-
cently, Ecuador in 2008, where president Correa threatened to repudiate from
debt, branding substantial parts of Ecuadorian government debt as “odious”
and “illegitimate”.
8. Data disclosure problems? (yes/no): Are there any data disclosure prob-
lems, i.e. does the government refuse to provide information on crucial ne-
gotiation issues or is there an open dispute with creditors due to inaccurate
data? The provision of accurate and reliable data by the government con-
stitutes a basic requirement for negotiations. Lacking accurate information,
private creditors cannot reasonably evaluate restructuring proposals by the
government or the country’s capacity to repay. As such, information provision
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is a key element for the consensual resolution of a crisis. While data disclosure
problems are not very frequent, they have been of high importance in some
cases, as for example in Brazil 1987, in Peru 1996 or in Ecuador 2008/09.
9. Forced and non-negotiated restructuring? (yes/no): Was the restruc-
turing negotiated with creditors or unilaterally imposed by the government?
This sub-indicator differentiates between restructurings that result from ne-
gotiations and those restructurings that are enforced unilaterally or launched
without prior consultations on the terms and conditions. Forced and non-
negotiated restructurings are rare and constitute a strong sign of coercive
debt policies. The restructuring of Argentina in 2005 as well as a forced debt
roll-over in Peru of 1986 are among the few examples.
The score of the final coerciveness index is additive, summing up the individual sub-
indicators. The index takes the value of 1 if a country announced or started debt
renegotiations but did not fulfil any other coerciveness criterion, not even missed
payments. During debt crisis periods the index therefore ranges from a minimum
of 1, indicating very cooperative government behaviour, to 10, for particularly ag-
gressive debt policies. In the absence of default or debt renegotiations, the index is
simply coded as 0. Figure 3.2 illustrates the construction of the coerciveness index
graphically. Moreover, Figure C.2 in the Appendix shows the distribution of the
coerciveness index and reports summary statistics for the coerciveness index and its
sub-indicators.
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Figure 3.2: Construction of the coerciveness index
Notes — The figure illustrates the construction of the coerciveness index. It is taken from Enderlein et al.
(2012).
3.2.4 The size of haircuts
We capture the central outcome of the debt restructuring process by the size of the
creditor haircuts implied by the “final” restructurings between the government and
its creditors. For this purpose, we build on the database of investor losses by Cruces
and Trebesch (2013) that measures creditor haircuts based on the methodology
proposed by Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2008) as:
H iSZt = 1−
Present V alue of New Debt (rit)
Present V alue of Old Debt (rit)
,
where rit is the discount factor employed to calculate the present value of old and
new debt instruments.
The number of final deals in our sample totals to 30 cases. Figure C.3 shows how the
haircuts in our sample are distributed over time and reports some basic summary
statistics for haircuts.
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3.2.5 Default coding and sample composition
Our analysis covers the years between 1980 and 2009 and is based on a sample
of 61 developing and emerging market economies. Starting with a full universe of
economies, we arrive at our final country sample as follows: Given our focus on debt
crises involving commercial creditors, we first exclude those countries for which we
can reasonably assume that they had only very limited access to private credit over
our sample period. Specifically, we drop all those countries that have been classified
by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank as highly indebted poor
countries (HIPCs) and are therefore eligible for special support within the IMF’s
and the World Bank’s HIPC debt relief initiative. For the same reason, we also
drop small countries with a population of less than 1 million (as measured at the
end of our sample period). As no advanced economy defaulted during our sample
period, we moreover exclude all advanced economies in order to make our sample
as homogeneous as possible. Furthermore, we leave out those countries whose debt
restructurings took place under exceptional circumstances (namely Iraq and the
successor states of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia). Finally, we drop a few
defaulters for which no sufficient qualitative information on the debt restructuring
process has been available (Côte d’Ivoire, Cuba, Gabon, Iran, Jamaica, Kenya,
Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago and Vietnam). Our final sample thus includes 61
developing economies, of which 25 countries experienced at least one debt crisis
during our sample period while 36 countries did not. Table C.1 in the Appendix
lists all countries and years included.
As it is common in the literature on sovereign defaults, we follow the default defini-
tion of Standard & Poor’s and rely on their annual default list as a starting point.
S&P codes a government as being in default if the government misses payments
on either interest or principal of bonds or bank loans on the due date or, alterna-
tively, if it announces a debt exchange offer that leads to less favourable conditions
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for creditors than those in the original contracts (cp. Appendix 1 of Standard &
Poor’s, 2011). However, in a few cases we extend this data, since S&P does not ac-
count for pre-default renegotiations, i.e. debt renegotiations that take place without
missed payments by the sovereign. Consequently, we also consider a country to be
in default in case the government publicly announced to restructure its debt. All in
all, our sample covers 1,638 annual country observations, of which 217 observations
are debt crisis years.
3.3 Government coerciveness and GDP growth
during default
3.3.1 Graphical analysis and stylised facts
We start our analysis of growth during debt crises with a graphical view at the
data. Figure 3.3 illustrates the development of real GDP per capita from three
years before until five years after start of default. The starting year itself is labelled
as year zero (black vertical line) and GDP is normalised to 100 in the year prior to
default.
Panel A depicts the average evolution of GDP for the debt crisis episodes in our
sample.4 In line with Levy-Yeyati and Panizza (2011), we find that the onset of a
debt crisis roughly marks the beginning of a recovery, at least in the full sample of
crises. On average, GDP already starts to decline prior to a debt crisis and shrinks
4In total, our sample includes 38 debt crises. This number is bigger than the number of
defaulting countries (25) due to the fact that some of the countries defaulted multiple times (cp.
Table C.1 in the Appendix). Figure 3.3 is based on 33 crisis episodes. For the case of Poland, our
data only starts in the year 1991 and Poland is coded as being in default that year. However, since
Poland has been in default since already 1981, it would be a mistake to interpret the year 1991
as the start of the Polish debt crisis and we therefore dropped this case for our graphical analysis.
Furthermore, we left out the debt crises of Uruguay in 1987, Romania in 1986, Morocco in 1986
and South Africa in 1989 due to the fact that these debt crises followed within five years after the
start of a prior debt crisis and therefore cannot be interpreted as independent events.
83
3. The Output Costs of Soft and Hard Sovereign Defaults
Figure 3.3: Evolution of GDP around start of default
(a) Panel A: All defaults
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(b) Panel B: Hard and soft defaults
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Notes — The solid lines plot the average development of real GDP per capita from three years before
until five years after the start of default, and the dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals. Real GDP
per capita has been normalised to 100 in the year before the start of default. Whereas Panel A pictures
the evolution of GDP over all 33 default episodes, Panel B splits the sample into cases of “soft” (blue)
and “hard” (red) defaults (at the median value of the observed average coerciveness during the default
episodes) and plots the evolution of GDP for both groups separately.
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in the year of default by around four per cent. One year afterwards, however, output
starts to recover and reaches its pre-crisis level four years after.
In Panel B of Figure 3.3, we divide our sample into cases of hard and soft defaults.
For this purpose, we compute the average value of the coerciveness index over each
debt crisis and cut the sample at the median value, which is 3.4. This results in 16
cases categorised as soft defaults (government coerciveness of less than 3.4) and 17
cases of hard default (coerciveness index larger than 3.4). As can be seen, output
behaves very differently for both groups. In soft default spells, output drops only
marginally in the first crisis year and quickly picks up afterwards. However, the
picture looks drastically different for hard defaults, as output collapses by around
seven per cent in the first crisis year and continues to tumble during the subsequent
year. Thereafter, the economy recovers only sluggishly, such that five years after
the outbreak of the crisis, GDP still remains more than five percentage points below
its pre-crisis level. Thus in stark contrast to the stylised fact of Levy-Yeyati and
Panizza (2011), the default clearly does not mark the beginning of recovery for
hard defaulters. As the confidence bands of the two sub-groups do not overlap, the
differences in real GDP performance are statistically significant at the 10% level.
Figure 3.3 gives a first impression of the link between government coerciveness and
growth. However, it should be interpreted cautiously, since it only compares the
development of the unconditional GDP averages of both sub-groups. In the following
subsection, we therefore analyse the relationship between debtor coerciveness and
GDP in a more systematic way.
3.3.2 Regression analysis
We start with a bare bones specification in Model 1, in which we regress the annual
growth rate of real GDP per capita (Growthi,t) on a dummy variable capturing
whether a country is in default (Defaulti,t) and on a set of year dummies to con-
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trol for global (i.e. not country-specific) time trends in GDP growth in a pooled
OLS setting. In line with previous research, the default dummy turns out highly
significant and negative (cp. Table 3.1, column 1). Its coefficient value of around
-1.1 indicates that being in a debt crisis reduces a country’s GDP growth by around
1.1% per year.
In Model 2, we now run a horse race between the binary default dummy and the
coerciveness index (Coerci,t). As can be seen, the coerciveness index turns out
highly significant with a large negative coefficient. A one notch increase in the
coerciveness index is associated with a 0.6 percentage point decline in a country’s
real GDP growth for each crisis year. We also find that the default dummy becomes
insignificant, suggesting that the coerciveness index captures relevant additional
information over and above the crisis dummy.
In Models 3-7, we add the set of macro controls (Xi,t) most commonly used in the
cost of default literature (Sturzenegger, 2004; Borensztein and Panizza, 2009; Levy-
Yeyati and Panizza, 2011). Specifically, we include investment to GDP (InvGDP),
rate of population growth (∆Pop), log of total population (Log(Pop)), percentage of
the population that completed secondary education (SecEdu), lagged annual growth
of government consumption (GovtConst−1), an index of civil liberties (CivLib), an-
nual change in terms-of-trade (∆ToT ), openness, as proxied by the ratio of imports
plus exports to GDP (Openness), and a dummy variable for banking crises (Bank-
ingCrisis). Table C.3 in the Appendix provides a detailed description of each control
variable and its source.
Column (3) shows that controlling for the set of macro controls barely changes the
coefficient and significance of the default dummy compared to the parsimonious
Model 1. It is worth highlighting that the results in Model 3 are almost identi-
cal to those of the previous literature on growth and default. Indeed, the default
coefficient of -1.1 is very similar to what Panizza et al. (2009) estimate in a com-
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parable estimation setup.5 However, the default dummy again turns insignificant
once we include the coerciveness index in the regression (Model 4). While the coef-
ficient of the coerciveness index drops to (still substantial) -0.4 upon controlling for
macroeconomic conditions, it continues to be highly significant.
So far, our estimations took place in a pooled OLS framework. This leaves open the
question where the explanatory power of the coerciveness index stems from. Given
its annual coding, it could result (1) from variation in the coerciveness index across
different default episodes, (2) from variation of the coerciveness index within the
default episodes, or (3) from both.
Figure 3.3 already sheds some light on this question. The significant differences in
growth performance we found between episodes of hard and soft defaults suggest
that the index variation across crises should play an important role. The results
in column 5 of Table 3.1 provide further support in this regard. In this specifica-
tion, we replace our (annually coded) coerciveness index with a variable capturing
the average coerciveness over the entire debt crisis episode (AvgCoerc). While the
default dummy remains insignificant, average crisis coerciveness turns out as signifi-
cant and negative, albeit only at the 10% significance level. As average coerciveness
varies only across but not within debt crises, this underlines our previous descrip-
tive insight that debt crises in which governments adapt a tougher payment and
negotiation stance towards their creditors are indeed associated with weaker GDP
growth.
The fixed effect panel regression of Models 6 is a way to test the role of within-crisis
variation in the coerciveness index. By adding country fixed effects, the coercive-
ness index will no longer pick up cross-country differences in coerciveness, but only
5Panizza et al. (2009) estimate a default dummy coefficient of -1.3. We also get a result very
similar to Sturzenegger (2004), once we replace the default dummy (for each year during default)
with a dummy variable that only captures the first and the second year of a debt crisis. Debt crises
can then be associated with a decline in GDP growth of around 2% during the first two years of
default.
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the variation within countries over time. In addition, we control for the average
coerciveness of each debt crisis episode. This accounts for the fact that some coun-
tries in our sample defaulted multiple times, such that the estimated coerciveness
coefficient indeed only picks up the variation within the same debt crisis. Column 6
of Table 3.1 shows that the coerciveness index again turns out to be significant and
negative in this framework, supporting the view that within-crisis variation mat-
ters for our main result. Overall, we conclude that the coerciveness index helps to
explain output growth both within and across debt crisis events.
An important advantage of the country fixed effects model is that it accounts for
time-invariant confounders on the country level. The coefficient of the coerciveness
index in the pooled OLS Models 2 and 4 could be spurious if weak institutions or
some other unobserved country characteristic drive both the level of government
coerciveness and output performance during crises. The inclusion of fixed effects
thus avoids that our estimation results are biased due to time-invariant country-
specific characteristics.
Our baseline specification (7) therefore looks as follows:
Growthi,t = αi + αt + βDefaulti,t + γCoerci,t + δXi,t + εi,t ,
where αi and αt stand for country and time fixed effects, respectively, Xi,t is the
vector for our set of macroeconomic controls, and εi,t are heteroskedasticity robust
standard errors, clustered by country.
This specification only differs from Model 6 in that we leave out average coerciveness
as a control. The coerciveness index therefore captures the time variation within
debt crises as well as the variation between crises in the same country. Unsurpris-
ingly, the estimated coefficient and the significance of the coerciveness index increase
(to -0.57) when dropping average coerciveness.
We next check the validity of our main results in a series of robustness checks.
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3.3.3 Robustness checks
Autocorrelation of standard errors
First, it is well known that the past growth performance of a country importantly
predicts its contemporaneous and future growth. It is therefore possible that the
regression residuals are serially correlated. Autocorrelation in the error terms would
bias the estimated standard errors downwards and thus overestimate the t-statistics
(Cameron and Tivedi, 2005). One way to address this problem, is to add a lagged
value of our dependent variable (Growthi,t−1), which we do in column 1 of Table
3.2. As can be seen, the results remain largely unaltered and the coerciveness index
continues to be strongly significant and negative.
While including lagged GDP growth as an explanatory variable indeed solves the
problem of autocorrelated error terms in our model, this step can also bias the
estimation results, as famously pointed out by Hurwicz (1950) and Nickell (1981).
The fixed effects centre all variables by country, which induces a correlation between
the centred lagged dependent variable on the one hand and the centred error term
on the other. This “Nickell bias” is of order 1/T , such that it decreases with rising
T but is very serious for panels with a short time horizon. A sample of T=30, as it
is the case here, may still result in a bias of up to 20% of the true coefficient value,
as Monte Carlo simulations have shown (Judson and Owen, 1999).
In order to correct for this bias, we move back to a simple OLS framework.6 Column
2 shows that our results continue to hold, although the coerciveness index decreases
in size and remains significant only at the 10% level. We therefore conclude that
our baseline estimation results are robust even after accounting for the possibility
of serially correlated errors.
6As has been shown by Beck and Katz (2011) and Judson and Owen (1999), simple OLS
performs about as good as other, more complicated, techniques to correct for the bias.
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Endogeneity of control variables
A further problem consists in the possibility that the “true” effect of debtor co-
erciveness might, at least partially, be captured by other variables now included
as controls, such as investment to GDP (InvGDP) and/or the level of openness of
a country (Openness).7 Consequently, we want to make sure that those variables
are not endogenous to GDP growth, which in turn is affected by a country’s coer-
civeness. To address this concern, we repeat our baseline regression in column 3,
but now instrument investment to GDP as well as openness by their first two lags.
Compared to the baseline estimation, our main results remain unchanged, while
(Openness) now becomes significant and positive.
Controlling for crisis duration
One important fact about debt crises is that they vary greatly in their length.
The debt crises of South Africa 1993 and Uruguay 2003, for example, only took
a few months to be resolved, while the crises of Panama and Peru started in the
1980s and persisted for 14 and 15 years, respectively. If the duration of a debt
crisis is correlated with debtor coerciveness, this could bias our estimation results.
Descriptive statistics do not suggest a close correlation of these two variables (cp.
Figure C.4 in the Appendix).8 We nonetheless extend our regression to explicitly
control for crisis duration by adding dummy variables that indicate the duration of
7See Sturzenegger (2004) for a similar argumentation with respect to the measurement of the
output costs of a default.
8The pairwise correlation between crisis duration and the coerciveness index is just 0.14. Most
importantly, changes in coerciveness do not exhibit any significant trend patterns over the course
of a crisis. Furthermore, the coerciveness index is more or less uniformly distributed across the
length of a debt crisis.
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the crisis.9 The results (reported in column 4 of Table 3.2) remain stable, suggesting
that crisis duration does not bias our estimation results in a significant way.
Sub-sample of debt crisis years
Our regressions so far covered a broad sample including both debt crisis and non-
crisis years as well as defaulters and non-defaulters. As a robustness check, we
now test the explanatory power of the coerciveness index on growth, by restricting
the sample to the sub-sample of debt crisis years only (217 annual observations).
The small number of observations, however, makes it difficult to use the set of
controls from our baseline regression. In column 5 of Table 3.2, we therefore regress
annual GDP growth on the coerciveness index, using country fixed effects as the
only control. Again, the results confirm our prior findings, which is also true if we
additionally control for crisis duration.
Additional control variables
Our baseline model with time and country fixed effects avoids any bias due to un-
observed time-invariant country idiosyncrasies and also accounts for the influence of
a common time trend (such as the influence of the world business cycle) on country
growth. However, our estimation results could still be biased due to the omission
of time-varying country-specific variables correlated with both the government pay-
ment and negotiation behaviour and real GDP growth. The inclusion of the vector
of macro controls Xi,t should ease this concern to some extent. However, there could
be additional variables that affect both growth and coerciveness of a country and
for which we do not yet control.
9More technically, we add dummy variables that take on the value of one during each year in
which the respective country has been at least i years in default (for i ∈ {1; 15}). This approach
should provide a clean identification of the effects of crisis duration and avoids ad hoc assumptions
on the functional form of how crisis duration affects GDP growth.
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In column 6 of Table 3.2, we hence expand the set of macroeconomic controls and
additionally control for the occurrence of currency crises (CurrencyCrisis), the debt
to GDP ratio (DebtGDP), and a country’s level of inflation (Inflation). Since Debt-
GDP, similar to InvGDP and Openness, might expose our estimation to endogene-
ity, we instrument that variable by its first two lags. The results leave our baseline
estimation results by and large unchanged with coerciveness retaining its highly
significant and negative coefficient.
Finally, we also add country-specific time trends as control variables to account for
the presence of any country-specific (linear) time trend in GDP growth. Again, the
results confirm the significant correlation of the coerciveness index with growth (see
column 7 of Table 3.2). We thus find the negative correlation between coerciveness
and growth to be highly robust.
3.3.4 Can we interpret our results causally?
It is possible that the observed negative correlation between coerciveness and GDP
growth is due to reverse causality. Thus, output growth could well influence a
government’s payment and negotiation behaviour vis-à-vis its external creditors.
Steep declines in GDP can erode a country’s tax base and foreign exchange revenues,
thus damaging the country’s ability to repay. Therefore, the steeper a country’s
GDP decline in the context of a debt crisis, the more willing it might actually
become to engage in coercive creditor policies.
To address this possibility, we test whether lagged values of real GDP per capita
growth can predict current debtor coerciveness. Columns 1-3 of Table 3.3 show
that the coefficients of lagged GDP growth are clearly insignificant at different lag
lengths, suggesting that past growth performance does not significantly affect the
government’s subsequent debt policies. Of course, this does not preclude the possi-
bility of a contemporaneous causal effect of real growth on debtor coerciveness. But
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Table 3.3: Enquiry of causality
Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coerc Coerc Coerc Coerc Growth
Growtht−1 -0.0136 -0.0128 -0.0148
(0.0090) (0.0091) (0.0091)
Growtht−2 -0.0107 -0.0058
(0.0091) (0.0099)
Growtht−3 -0.0106
(0.0087)
IICCR -0.0035**
(0.0015)
Coerct−1 0.7782***
(0.0298)
SurpCoerc -0.4677**
(0.2264)
ExpCoerc 0.0656
(0.2847)
N 965 964 937 1,451 965
Countries 45 45 45 45 45
Time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES
Standard macro ctrl’s YES YES YES NO YES
R2 0.6460 0.6461 0.6467 0.5507 0.4291
Notes — In columns (1) to (4), the dependent variable is the coerciveness index, which measures a country’s
negotiation and payment behaviour during each year of default. In column (5), the dependent variable is
the annual growth rate of real GDP per capita, measured in per cent. Robust standard errors (clustered
by country) are given in parentheses. In column (5), the standard errors have been adjusted to account for
the presence of an imputed regressor bias due to the fact that SurpCoerc and ExpCoerc are not actually
observed but estimated with sampling error in regression (4) (Murphy-Topel standard errors). ***, **,
and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent levels, respectively.
the results provide some assurance that reverse causality is not the main channel
behind our findings.
To shed further light on the issue, we try to isolate the direct effects of coerciveness
from potential expectation effects. This is in line with Borensztein and Panizza
(2009) and Panizza et al. (2009), who argue that the drop in output at the start
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of debt crises could (to some extent) be driven by investor expectations about a
country’s default rather than by the default event per se. We therefore explore
whether the observed output contraction can mostly be explained by imminent co-
ercive actions of the government (“surprise coerciveness”) or rather by the market’s
expectations about coerciveness. To the extent that investors take into account the
future growth prospects of economies when forming their coerciveness expectations,
the expected part of coerciveness should pick up the part of the contemporaneous
correlation between coerciveness and growth that is potentially affected by reverse
causality. Surprise coerciveness, on the other hand, should be predominantly free
from this concern and, hence, approximate the imminent causal effect of coerciveness
on growth.
To disentangle expected and unexpected coerciveness, we resort to a strategy similar
to Barro (1977). It consists in dividing the coerciveness index into an anticipated
and an unanticipated component and then to test the marginal influence of both
components on GDP growth. To this end, we first regress a country’s coerciveness
on the country’s credit rating (IICCR) at the start of each year (in January) and
on lagged coerciveness (Coerct−1).
Coerci,t = αi + αt + β1Coerci,t−1 + β2IICCRi,t + ui,t .
The rationale behind the explanatory variables in the regression is the following.
Whereas it is reasonable to assume that the country’s negotiation and payment
behaviour of the past year influences the market’s expectations on coerciveness for
the current year, a country’s start-of-year credit rating should also pick up expec-
tations about its future payment and negotiation behaviour. If this is true, one can
interpret the fitted values of this regression as the “expected” part of coerciveness,
whereas the residual of the equation should proxy the “unexpected” or “surprise”
part of coerciveness.
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As our rating measure, we use the Institutional Investor’s country credit ratings
(IICCR), which have been widely used in the debt crisis literature (see Reinhart
et al., 2003). The IICCR is based on information provided by senior economists
and sovereign risk analysts at leading global banks and money management firms.
Survey participants grade each country’s credit risk on a scale from 0 (maximum
credit risk) to 100 (minimum credit risk). In the final index, the survey responses are
weighted according to the global credit exposure of each participating institution,
such that the measure is a reasonable proxy of the average market assessment of a
country’s willingness and ability to repay.
An important advantage of the IICCR is that it has a much broader coverage than
ratings by the three major rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch), going back as
far as 1978 and covering more than 100 countries. For our purposes, a further crucial
advantage of the IICCR is that it is available on a continuous basis even within
debt crises. This differs from most other credit ratings, which simply rate countries
as “in default” without further differentiation. During defaults, the IICCR credit
score can thus be interpreted as indicating the (perceived and expected) severity of a
debt crisis at each point in time. More specifically, the IICCR survey is conducted
semi-annually, in January and July of each year. Since we are working with annual
data, we use the January country credit rating to capture the market’s country
credit risk assessment at the start of that year.
The results of the first step regression are shown in column 4 of Table 3.3. Both
regressors turn out highly significant. Even though the regression includes only two
explanatory variables, its R2 of around 0.55 indicates a good fit with coerciveness
data.
In a second step, the residual and the fitted value of the first step regression (in-
terpreted as “surprise” and “expected” coerciveness, respectively) are now included
as regressors in our standard growth regression, replacing the original coerciveness
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index. In order to avoid the problem of biased estimators — due to the fact that the
imputed variables are not actually observed, but estimated with sampling error in
the first step regression (cp. Murphy and Topel, 1985) —, we correct the standard
errors according to the procedure proposed by Hardin (2002) and Hole (2006).
The results of the second stage regression are shown in column 5 of Table 3.3.
Surprise coerciveness (i.e. the unexpected component) is highly significant and
negative, while expected coerciveness does not seem to impact a country’s growth.
We interpret this result as a further sign that our main findings are not driven
by reverse causality. This gives us confidence that our finding can be interpreted
causally, i.e. that confrontational debtor policies indeed lead to a decline in GDP
growth.
The “gold standard” to deal with the issue of reverse causality in empirical stud-
ies certainly consists in finding a strong and exogenous instrument for the dubious
regressor. This, however, turns out to be a very difficult task since we need to
find an instrument that is closely correlated with the coerciveness index while being
exogenous to GDP growth. The exogeneity assumption is doubtful for any macroe-
conomic variable. We therefore turned to institutional and political variables, such
as the timing of democratic elections (using only regular elections, i.e. those foreseen
by the electoral cycle) and measures of democratisation. However, these political
variables do not exhibit enough variation to qualify as strong instruments for the
time-varying coerciveness index. Hence, even though we do find results that support
our main findings, we prefer not to show the instrumental variable regressions as
they are not sufficiently credible.
100
3. The Output Costs of Soft and Hard Sovereign Defaults
3.4 Haircut size and post-default growth
3.4.1 Graphical analysis and stylised facts
We now turn to the question to what degree haircuts, the central outcome of an
often protracted restructuring process, help to predict a country’s post-crisis growth.
As in section 3.3, we start with a graphical analysis of the data. Figure 3.4 depicts
the development of real GDP per capita around the end of default, from three years
before until five years after the conclusion of a final deal. The end of the debt crisis
is labelled as year zero (black vertical line) and, as in Figure 3.3, GDP is normalised
to 100 in year -1.
Panel A of Figure 3.4 shows the average development of real GDP per capita for all
end-of-default episodes in our sample.10 One can see that output increases notably
around the end of a default and continues to grow at a rapid pace for the subsequent
five years.
As in Figure 3.3, we divide our sample into cases of hard and soft default (Panel
B), now using the median haircut size (which is 35.8%) as the separation criterion.
The 15 debt crises that ended with a haircut larger than 35.8% are coded as hard
defaults, while the 15 crises involving lower haircuts are coded as soft defaults.
Surprisingly, the graphical analysis shows almost no difference in the post-default
growth performance of soft and hard defaulters. Both average GDP growth and the
confidence bands look nearly identical, suggesting that also the dispersion in post-
default growth rates is similarly distributed in both sub-groups. Hence, in contrast
10In total there are 38 debt crises in our sample (cp. Table C.1 in the Appendix). In line
with Cruces and Trebesch (2013), we identify post-crisis episodes as those episodes that were not
followed by another restructuring vis-à-vis private creditors within the subsequent four years. This
is not the case for Morocco 1983, Romania 1983, South Africa 1987 and 1989, Uruguay 1985 and
1987 as well as for Venezuela 1988, such that we do not include them in this part of the analysis.
Furthermore, we leave out the case of the Venezuela 2004/2005 since this default has been very
peculiar and it is very controversial to what extent this even constituted a case of sovereign default.
The default ended in 2005 without any restructuring negotiations and/or haircut with Venezuela
making all due payments on the oil-indexed bond that caused the default.
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of GDP around end of default
(a) Panel A: All defaults
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(b) Panel B: Hard and soft defaults
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Notes — The solid lines plot the average development of real GDP per capita from three years before until
five years after the conclusion of a final deal, and the dashed lines are 90% confidence intervals. Real GDP
per capita has been normalised to 100 in the year before the conclusion of a final deal. Whereas Panel A
pictures the evolution of GDP over all 30 default episodes in the sample, Panel B splits the sample into
cases of “soft” (blue) and “hard” (red) defaults (at the median value of the observed final deal haircut
size) and plots the evolution of GDP for both groups separately.
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to our graphical result for growth during crises, we do not find much evidence for
the idea that the severity of a crisis matters for post-default growth. In the next
section, we test the relationship between growth and haircuts in a more systematic
way.
3.4.2 Regression analysis
We begin with a näıve OLS estimation, regressing per capita GDP growth on hair-
cuts (Haircuts5 ). In order to avoid that our estimation results get biased by the
low growth rates experienced during the default episodes, we restrict our sample
to include only non-default observations. Since it is our purpose to measure the
explanatory power of haircuts on post-default growth, our variable of interest, Hair-
cuts5, takes on the size of the final deal haircut in the year of the end of default
and the subsequent five years. In this first regression, we include year dummies to
account for the presence of a global time trend in GDP growth as the only controls.
Column 1 of Table 3.4 shows that in this estimation framework haircuts show up
highly significant and positive, indicating that countries with high haircuts tend to
grow faster in the post-default period.
A crucial problem with this näıve estimation is the fact that there is a general
tendency of GDP growth to strongly increase after the settlement of a debt crisis.11
To account for this effect, in Model 2 we add a dummy control variable (FinalDeal5 )
that takes on the value one in the final year of the debt crisis and the subsequent
five years. With the inclusion of this control, our haircut measure virtually ceases
to be significant (p-value of 0.099, see column 2 of Table 3.4).
In Model 3, we add the (previously used) vector of macroeconomic controls, Xi,t.
This causes the coefficient of Haircuts5 to switch signs, but it remains insignificant.
11Average growth of real GDP per capita during the five past-default years is close to 3%, while
during “normal” non-default periods it is only around 2.5% in our sample. This may be due to a
“catch-up” effect following the low GDP growth during default.
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So far we have tested the relationship between haircuts and growth in a (pooled)
OLS framework. To avoid that our estimation results are biased due to the existence
of unobserved (time-invariant) country-specific variables, we now re-estimate Model
3 with country fixed effects. Again, this leaves our estimation results by and large
unaltered (see column 4 of Table 3.4). Most importantly, the haircut variable now
clearly turns out insignificant.
As before, we also instrument the investment to GDP ratio (InvGDP) and the level
of openness (Openness) with their first two lags in Model 5. Again, the insignificance
of haircuts remains unchanged, which is also true when adding (CurrencyCrisis),
(DebtGDP) and (Inflation) as further controls (column 6 of Table 3.4).
How can we interpret the insignificance of the haircut coefficient, especially given
the fact that debtor coerciveness proved to be highly significant in explaining GDP
growth during default? One way of interpretation would be that only coerciveness
affects growth while haircuts do not. In order to test this hypothesis, we check
whether, in contrast to haircuts, the average coerciveness of a country across the
whole debt crisis episode (AvgCoerc) helps to explain post-default growth. Table
C.2 in the Appendix shows that this is also not the case.
A different interpretation is that, at the time of the final deal conclusion, the final
haircut size does not come as a surprise to capital markets but has already been
anticipated in the time of restructuring negotiations. To the extent that the size
of haircuts reduces the growth rates of countries, it should therefore have already
done so during the restructuring period and no additional growth effect should be
expected from the revelation of the final deal haircut. In this sense, the significance
of our coerciveness index, which captures the negotiation and payment behaviour
of governments during the debt crises, could be interpreted as a measure of market
expectations on future creditor losses/haircuts.
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The fact that a country’s average coerciveness over the debt crisis and the final
haircut are closely correlated (pairwise correlation of about 60%) lends support to
this interpretation. Furthermore, we test this hypothesis in column 7 of Table 3.4
by using haircuts instead of (average) coerciveness to explain GDP growth during
default in the setup of specification 5 of subsection 3.3.2.12 Indeed, haircuts turn out
to be significant at the 10% level. The coefficient of around -3.5 indicates that an
increase in the haircut by 10 percentage points goes along with an annual reduction
in GDP growth of 0.35% during defaults. We interpret this as clear support for the
“expectation hypothesis” of haircuts. Taken together, our results therefore suggest
that the “type” of default only affects GDP growth during a debt crisis, but not
after it has been resolved.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we move beyond the classical dichotomous treatment of sovereign
defaults and analyse how the severity of a debt crisis affects output growth during
and after default. We find strong evidence that the “type” of a debt crisis is of
crucial importance for a country’s growth performance during default. In particular,
we find that coercive government behaviour towards external creditors is associated
with a much steeper drop in output when compared to cases with consensual crisis
resolution.
On average, “hard” defaults go along with up to six percentage points lower growth
during a crisis than “soft” defaults. This result is robust in a cross-section of de-
faulters and non-defaulters, in a sub-sample of crisis years, in a panel framework
with country and year fixed effects, and when accounting for autocorrelated stan-
dard errors, endogenous control variables and crisis duration. Moreover, we tackled
12To do so, we define HaircutsDef to take on the value of the final deal haircut during each
year of default.
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the issue of reverse causality and found evidence that our results can indeed be
interpreted causally. Surprisingly however, our findings suggest that the growth
effects of the type of default are limited to the years during a debt crisis and do not
to extend to the post-default period.
We conclude that any analysis on the cost of a sovereign debt crisis needs to account
for the magnitude of default and not only for its occurrence. This is in line with
the recent survey piece by Aguiar and Amador (2013) who recommend to consider
“richer notions of default”. We therefore hope that our empirical insights may
motivate and discipline future theoretical work on the issue.
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Figure A.1: Central bank misperception in the US based on University of
Michigan 1y ahead inflation expectations
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Notes — The upper figure plots the 1-year-ahead inflation forecasts (CPI and PCE) by the Fed (in its
Greenbook) and the one year inflation expectations as collected by the University of Michigan in its
monthly Survey of Consumers from 2000 to 2006. The lower figure compares the policy rates prescribed
by the (forward-looking) Taylor rule for the different inflation forecasts/expectations with the actual policy
rates set by the Fed. All estimations of the Taylor rule are based on the realtime output gap estimates in
the Greenbook.
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Table B.1: Sovereign bond yield data sources and availability
Bloomberg (33 countries)
1994 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, United Kingdom, United States (January), Switzerland (Febru-
ary)
1997 Portugal (February), Greece (July)
1998 Hong Kong (March), Singapore (June), India (November)
1999 Taiwan (April)
2000 Thailand (January), Czech Republic (April), South Korea (December)
2002 Slovakia (June), Romania (August)
2006 Israel (February)
2007 Slovenia (March)
2008 Iceland (April)
JP Morgan EMBI Global (41 countries)
1994 Argentina, Mexico, Nigeria, Venezuela (January), China (March), Brazil
(April), Bulgaria (July), Poland (October), South Africa (December)
1995 Ecuador (February)
1996 Turkey (June), Panama (July), Croatia (August), Malaysia (October)
1997 Colombia (February), Peru (March), Philippines, Russia (December)
1998 Lebanon (April)
1999 Hungary (January), Chile (May)
2000 Ukraine (May)
2001 Pakistan (January), Uruguay (May), Egypt (July), Dominican Republic
(November)
2002 El Salvador (April)
2004 Indonesia (May)
2005 Serbia (July), Vietnam (November)
2007 Belize (March), Kazakhstan (June), Ghana, Jamaica (October), Sri Lanka
(November), Gabon (December)
2008 Georgia (June)
2011 Jordan (January), Senegal (May), Lithuania, Namibia (November)
Notes — This table lists the sources of the sovereign bond yield data in the sample and the years in which
the respective time series are first observed (months in parentheses). If there are gaps in the Bloomberg
10-year generic yield series, we add observations of 10-year generic yields from Datastream, ensuring that
this does not induce structural breaks. Moreover, for some emerging countries we include 10-year generic
yields until the EMBI Global series become available.
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Table B.2: Rating changes, by region
Region Upgrades Downgrades
Caribbean 26 29
Central & Southwestern Asia 24 9
Central America 12 18
Central Europe 53 19
Eastern Asia 46 26
Eastern Europe 41 38
Middle East 61 24
North America 17 9
Northern Africa 5 14
Northern Asia 23 12
Northern Europe 23 14
Oceania 17 12
South America 108 77
Southeastern Asia 50 34
Southeastern Europe 55 32
Southern Asia 14 13
Southern Europe 28 54
Sub-Saharan Africa 23 10
Western Europe 9 18
635 462
Notes — This table shows the regional distribution of the sample of 1,097 upgrade and downgrade an-
nouncements made by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch between 1994 and 2011. Regions are defined based on
the CIA World Factbook.
113
B. Appendix to Chapter 2
Table B.3: Rating scales and transformation
Characterisation of debt
and issuer
Letter rating Linear
transformation
S&P Moody’s Fitch
Highest quality
In
ve
st
m
en
t
gr
ad
e
AAA Aaa AAA 17
High quality
AA+ Aa1 AA+ 16
AAA Aa2 AA 15
AA– Aa3 AA– 14
Strong payment capacity
A+ A1 A+ 13
A A2 A 12
A– A3 A– 11
Adequate payment
capacity
BBB+ Baa1 BBB+ 10
BBB Baa2 BBB 9
BBB– Baa3 BBB– 8
Likely to fulfil obligations,
ongoing uncertainty
S
p
ec
u
la
ti
ve
gr
ad
e
BB+ Ba1 BB+ 7
BB Ba2 BB 6
BB– Ba3 BB– 5
High credit risk
B+ B1 B+ 4
B B2 B 3
B– B3 B– 2
Very high credit risk
CCC+ Caa1 CCC+
CCC Caa2 CCC
CCC– Caa3 CCC–
Near default with
possibility of recovery
CC Ca CC 1
C
Default
SD C DDD
D DD
D
Notes — This table shows how the letter ratings used by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch correspond to one
another and to different degrees of credit risk, and how they are mapped into the linear 17-notch scale
used in the investigation. The transformation is the same as in Afonso et al. (2012), from which this table
is adapted.
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Table B.5: Baseline regressions — Pooling all rating changes
LARGE 0.0102
(0.0064)
LARGE × Down 0.0178**
(0.0087)
InitRat -0.0012
(0.0008)
InitRat × Down -0.0005
(0.0009)
∆InitRat -0.0005
(0.0006)
∆InitRat × Down 0.0012
(0.0008)
OnWatch -0.0023
(0.0056)
OnWatch × Down -0.0153*
(0.0078)
SimActsWdwEvt -0.0036
(0.0053)
SimActsWdwEvt × Down 0.0206**
(0.0082)
SimActsDayNonEvt 0.0935*
(0.0541)
SimActsDayNonEvt × Down 0.0598
(0.0849)
VIX -0.0001
(0.0004)
VIX × Down 0.0008**
(0.0004)
Down -0.0217
(0.0141)
N 51,881
Event countries 104
Non-event countries 73
Rating actions 1,022
R2 0.0183
Notes — This table shows regressions based on the full baseline specification (see column (3) in Table
2.1) after pooling 635 upgrades and 462 downgrades made by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch between 1994 and
2011. For reasons of comparability, the dependent variable equals ∆Spread for downgrades, and -∆Spread
for upgrades. Down is a dummy variable taking on a value of one for downgrades, and zero otherwise.
The interaction term LARGE × Down indicates that there is a statistically significant difference between
the absolute coefficients for upgrades and downgrades.
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Table B.8: Spillover channels, downgrades — Different trade measures
Trade measure
ExpImpEvt TradeImpEvt ExpShEvt TradeShEvt
LARGE 0.0244*** 0.0246*** 0.0244*** 0.0246***
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073)
InitRat -0.0031 -0.0030 -0.0031 -0.0030
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021)
∆InitRat 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013 0.0013
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
OnWatch -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0004
(0.0059) (0.0060) (0.0059) (0.0060)
SimActsWdwEvt 0.0141** 0.0145** 0.0141** 0.0145**
(0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069) (0.0069)
SimActsDayNonEvt 0.1136* 0.1129* 0.1137* 0.1129*
(0.0619) (0.0619) (0.0619) (0.0619)
VIX 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Region 0.0348** 0.0324* 0.0345** 0.0326*
(0.0168) (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0167)
TradeBloc 0.0120 0.0139 0.0118 0.0139
(0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0120) (0.0121)
Trade measure 0.0580 0.0517 0.0298 0.0247
(0.2268) (0.1143) (0.0659) (0.0538)
CapOpenEvt 0.0126** 0.0131** 0.0127** 0.0131**
(0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063) (0.0063)
CapOpenNonEvt 0.0081 0.0088 0.0081 0.0088
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0089)
SizeEvt 0.0247 0.0259 0.0244 0.0258
(0.0330) (0.0333) (0.0330) (0.0332)
∆Size -0.0146 -0.0187 -0.0144 -0.0186
(0.0253) (0.0255) (0.0253) (0.0255)
∆TrendGrowth 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
N 19,724 19,511 19,715 19,502
Event countries 79 79 79 79
Non-event countries 70 70 70 70
Downgrades 405 405 405 405
R2 0.0434 0.0435 0.0434 0.0435
Notes — This table shows the robustness of our results on the spillover channels of downgrade announce-
ments to different measures of bilateral trade linkages. For purposes of comparison, we first report the
results from the most comprehensive specification using ExpImpEvt, the non-event country’s exports to
the event country relative to non-event country GDP (see column (7) in Table 2.3). Alternatively, we use
TradeImpEvt, which is bilateral trade (imports + exports) with the event country relative to non-event
country GDP. Finally, ExpShEvt and TradeShEvt measure the event country’s share in the non-event
country’s total exports and total bilateral trade, respectively.
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Figure B.1: Distribution of rating changes, by agency
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Notes — This figure shows the distribution of the severity of rating changes by agency, measured on a
17-notch scale (see Table B.3). Numbers are based on the sample of 1,097 rating announcements (635
upgrades, 462 downgrades) made by S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch between 1994 and 2011.
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Table C.1: Country sample composition
Defaulting countries (25 countries)
Albania: 1980-2009 (1991-1995) Pakistan: 1980-2009 (1998-1999)
Algeria: 1980-2009 (1991-1996) Panama: 1980-2009 (1983-1996)
Argentina: 1980-2009 (1982-1993; Peru: 1981-2009 (1983-1997)
2001-2005)
Brazil: 1980-2009 (1983-1994) Philippines: 1980-2009 (1983-1992)
Bulgaria: 1980-2009 (1990-1994) Poland: 1991-2009 (1991-1994)
Chile: 1980-2009 (1983-1990) Romania: 1980-2009 (1981-1983; 1986)
Costa Rica: 1980-2009 (1981-1990) Russia: 1989-2009 (1991-2000)
Dominican Republic: 1980-2009 (1982- South Africa: 1980-2009 (1985-1987;
1994; 2004-2005) 1989;1993)
Ecuador: 1980-2009 (1982-1995; 1999- Turkey: 1980-2009 (1982)
2000; 2008-2009)
Jordan: 1980-2009 (1989-1993) Ukraine: 1987-2009 (1998-2000)
Mexico: 1980-2009 (1982-1990) Uruguay: 1980-2009 (1983-1985; 1987;
1990-1991; 2003)
Morocco: 1980-2009 (1983; 1986-1990) Venezuela: 1980-2009 (1983-1988;
1990; 2004-2005)
Nigeria: 1980-2000 (1982-1992)
Non-defaulting countries (36 countries)
Armenia: 1995-2009 Lithuania: 1990-2009
Azerbaijan: 1995-2009 Malaysia: 1980-2009
Bahrain: 1980-2009 Mauritius: 1980-2009
Belarus: 1990-2009 Namibia: 1980-2009
Botswana: 1980-2009 Oman: 1980-2009
China: 1980-2009 Papua New Guinea: 1980-2009
Colombia: 1980-2009 Puerto Rico: 1980-2009
Egypt: 1980-2009 Qatar: 1995-2009
El Salvador: 1980-2009 Saudi Arabia: 1980-2009
Georgia: 1980-2009 Singapore: 1980-2009
Hong Kong: 1980-2009 Slovak Republic: 1984-2009
Hungary: 1980-2009 Swaziland: 1980-2009
India: 1980-2009 Syria: 1980-2009
Kazakhstan: 1990-2009 Thailand: 1980-2009
Kuwait: 1995-2009 Tunisia: 1980-2009
Latvia: 1980-2009 Turkmenistan: 1987-2009
Lebanon: 1992-2009 United Arab Emirates: 1980-2009
Libya: 1999-2009 Uzbekistan: 1987-2009
Notes — This table lists all countries included in the sample and reports the time period for which each
country is included (years of default in brackets).
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Figure C.1: Map of sample composition
Notes — This figure illustrates the sample composition. Countries that defaulted during the sample period
are coloured red, countries that did not default are coloured blue.
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Figure C.2: Coerciveness
(a) Distribution of coerciveness index
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(b) Descriptive statistics
Variable Frequency Mean Std. Dev.
Coerciveness index 217 3.61 1.98
Payments missed 155 0.71 0.45
Unilateral suspension 126 0.58 0.49
Full suspension 54 0.25 0.43
Freeze on assets 27 0.12 0.33
Negotiations breakdown 98 0.45 0.50
Moratorium declaration 28 0.13 0.34
Threats to repudiate 37 0.17 0.38
Data disputes 20 0.09 0.29
Forced restructuring 13 0.06 0.24
Notes — Figure (a) plots the distribution of the annual coerciveness index (Coerc), while Figure (b)
provides basic summary statistics on the coerciveness index and its sub-indicators. See section 3.2.3 for a
detailed description of the index and its sub-indicators.
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Figure C.3: Haircuts
(a) Size of haircuts across countries and time
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(b) Descriptive statistics
# of obs. Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Haircuts 30 5% 81% 38% 36% 21%
Notes — Figure (a) plots the size of haircuts in percentage points (HSZ) across countries and time, while
Figure (b) provides basic summary statistics. While haircuts range from 5% (Dominican Republic, 2005)
to more than 80% (Albania, 1995), on average final deals schedule haircuts of around 40%. See section
3.2.4 for a detailed description of haircuts.
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Figure C.4: Government coerciveness and crisis duration
(a) Average coerciveness and duration of sovereign default
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(b) Average change in coerciveness and duration of sovereign default
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Notes — Figure (a) shows the average value of the coerciveness value depending on the length of a debt
crisis. During the first year of a debt crisis the coerciveness index on average takes on a value of 3.1, in
the second year a value of around 3.6, and so on. Figure (b) plots the average change in coerciveness
during each year of a debt crisis (beginning from the second year of the debt crisis), with the dashed lines
indicating 90% confidence intervals. Note that the number of observations decreases with increasing crisis
length. For example the 15th year of a debt crisis is observed just once (Peru), and the 14th year only
thrice (Peru, Panama and Ecuador).
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